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1 
EXTRATERRITORIAL DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW 
THOMAS F. COTTER* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2018, the Supreme Court in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophys-
ical Corp. held that the owner of a U.S. patent could recover its lost profit 
on sales it would have made outside the United States, but for the defend-
ant’s violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2)—a rarely used provision of the 
Patent Act that prohibits, subject to certain conditions, the export of pa-
tented components for combination abroad. The Court left open the ques-
tion of whether owners also can recover extraterritorial damages result-
ing from the (much more common) setting in which the defendant is 
accused of an initial act of making, using, or selling the invention within 
the United States, in violation of section 271(a). Consideration of this 
question exposes an ostensible tension between two long-established 
principles of U.S. patent law: first, that owners are, in general, entitled 
to full compensation for their losses; and second, that patent rights are 
territorial—that is, unenforceable against conduct occurring outside a 
nation’s borders.     
This Article argues that allowing patent owners to recover damages 
for extraterritorial losses stemming from violations of section 271(a) 
does not, in fact, undermine the territoriality principle, as long as courts 
are consistent in their application of three limiting principles. The first is 
that the domestic infringement must be the cause-in-fact (or “but-for” 
cause) of the defendant’s subsequent foreign sales. While this require-
ment might seem obvious, in the present context it means that, if the 
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defendant could have avoided infringing the U.S. patent by outsourcing 
production, then, as a matter of economic logic, the domestic infringe-
ment is not a cause-in-fact of the extraterritorial sales, and at most the 
patent owner is entitled to a royalty reflecting the lower cost, if any, of 
domestic manufacture. Second, even if the domestic infringement is the 
cause-in-fact of foreign sales, the patent owner cannot recover damages 
unless those sales also are proximately caused by the domestic infringe-
ment. Contrary to the views of some commentators, however, there is 
nothing inherently unforeseeable, indirect, remote, or speculative about 
foreign sales tied to domestic infringement, and there is no sound public 
policy reason for categorically excluding them from consideration. The 
third principle is that courts should not compensate patent owners twice 
for the same loss. Fortunately, courts in the United States and elsewhere 
have considerable experience applying, under a range of circumstances, 
the “single recovery” rule (otherwise known as the rule against double 
recovery). Taken together, application of these principles should enable 
courts to avoid the parade of horribles that some commentators fear will 
result from any slackening of the territoriality principle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Let’s begin with a hypothetical. Suppose that a firm—call it 
Starchild Solar Systems, Inc.—is the owner of a U.S. patent on a new 
type of solar photovoltaic cell. Starchild engages in the domestic manu-
facture of solar cells incorporating its patented technology and then mar-
kets these products throughout the United States and Canada. One of 
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Starchild’s principal competitors, Big Bang Solar LLC, also makes solar 
cells in the United States and sells them to customers in both countries. 
In 2020, Starchild files suit against Big Bang, alleging that Big Bang’s 
manufacture and sale of solar cells in the United States violates 
Starchild’s U.S. patent. If it turns out that the patent is both valid and 
infringed, and Starchild can prove that it would have made an additional 
one hundred sales to U.S. customers absent the infringement, U.S. law 
would entitle Starchild to recover its lost profits on those forgone sales.1 
Suppose, however, that Starchild can also prove that, but for Big Bang’s 
infringing domestic manufacture of solar cells, Starchild would have 
made an additional one hundred sales in Canada. Unlike Big Bang’s sales 
in the United States, these Canadian sales do not infringe the U.S. patent;2 
but the preceding act of domestic U.S. manufacture, which enabled the 
Canadian sales, does. On these facts, should Starchild be entitled to re-
cover its lost profit on the lost Canadian sales, in accordance with the 
well-established principle that courts generally should “afford the plain-
tiff full compensation for the infringement”?3 Or should the court reject 
the claim for lost profits on the Canadian sales, in accordance with the 
 
 
1 See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Panduit 
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
2 In general, U.S. patent rights do not apply extraterritorially. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437, 443–44 (2007); Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195–96 (1856). Therefore, the 
sales in Canada would not infringe the U.S. patent. If Starchild has a corresponding Canadian pa-
tent, Big Bang’s sales in Canada may infringe the Canadian patent, but a U.S. court would be un-
likely to adjudicate a claim for the infringement of the Canadian patent. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 
476 F.3d 887, 897–905 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that, in view of, inter alia, the principle of patent 
independence, it was an abuse of discretion for a U.S. court to assert supplemental jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claims arising under foreign patents); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property art. 4 bis, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (providing inde-
pendence of patents for the same invention obtained in different countries); cf. Graeme B. Din-
woodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territorial-
ity?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 733–34, 752–60, 792–800 (2009) (critiquing some of the 
reasoning of Voda and arguing that courts should have authority to adjudicate foreign patent claims 
under some circumstances, while recognizing that for the most part courts do not do so). The law 
in the United Kingdom on this issue may be changing, however. See Actavis Grp. hf v. Eli Lilly & 
Co. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 517, [51], [2013] RPC 37 (Eng.) (“[T]he English court has jurisdiction to 
entertain claims for infringement of foreign intellectual property rights provided validity is not in 
issue and there is a basis for exercising jurisdiction over the defendant.”).     
3 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654–55 (1983) (stating that, in enacting 35 
U.S.C. § 284, which states that “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement,” “Congress sought to ensure that the patent owner would in fact receive full 
compensation for ‘any damages’ he suffered as a result of the infringement” and that “Congress’ 
overriding purpose” was to “afford[ ] patent owners complete compensation”); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d 
at 1544–45 (interpreting Devex and the plurality opinion in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Re-
placement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964), as articulating a “but for” test, under which “the general 
rule for determining actual damages to a patentee that is itself producing the patented item is to 
determine the sales and profits lost to the patentee because of the infringement”); see also Grain 
Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Rite-Hite 
for the proposition that “[f]ull compensation includes any foreseeable lost profits the patent owner 
can prove”). 
1. Cotter ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 6/8/2021  10:25 AM 
4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 39:1 
(equally venerable) principle that U.S. patent law “makes no claim to ex-
traterritorial effect?”4   
The hypothetical facts above are fictional; but the general fact pat-
tern, and variations on it, have arisen from time to time both in the United 
States and abroad.5 Addressing one of these variations, in 2018 the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., held 
that the owner of a U.S. patent could recover its lost profit on sales it 
would have made outside the United States, but for the defendant’s vio-
lation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).6 Section 271(f)(2) is a little-used7 provi-
sion of the U.S. Patent Act that prohibits the supply from within the 
United States of a component of a patented invention with the intent that 
it will be combined outside the United States in a manner that would in-
fringe the U.S. patent had the combination occurred within the United 
States.8 Since WesternGeco, a handful of district courts have begun to 
consider whether patent owners can also recover extraterritorial damages 
resulting from a defendant’s violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which gen-
erally forbids the unauthorized manufacture, use, or sale of a patented 
invention within the United States.9 So far, however, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears all appeals in U.S. 
patent infringement actions, has yet to weigh in on whether WesternGeco 
implicitly overrules earlier Federal Circuit case law precluding extrater-
ritorial damages for violations of section 271(a). 
This Article argues that courts should permit patent owners to re-
cover damages to compensate for extraterritorial sales tied to domestic 
 
 
4 Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 444 (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. at 195).     
5 See infra Part I. 
6 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,138 S. Ct. 2129, 2134, 2139 (2018).    
7 A Lex Machina search conducted in June 2020 reported 72,416 patent cases from January 1, 2000, 
through June 15, 2020. Within this dataset, there were 33,428 complaints citing section 271(a) or 
keywords relating to section 271(a) (e.g., “direct infringement”); 441 citing section 271(f) or key-
words relating to section 271(f) (e.g., “supplying components”); and 118 citing section 271(f)(2) 
(search results are on file with author). Presumably, some complaints cited other provisions of sec-
tion 271, or none at all, but the relative scarcity of explicit citations to section 271(f) or related 
keywords (or to section 271(f)(2) in particular) is consistent with the belief that these provisions 
are not commonly used. See, e.g., Eric Enger, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Focus on IP Damages 
Issues, THE ADVOCATE (TEX.), Spring 2019, at 10, 12 (describing section 271(f)(2) as “a rarely 
used infringement theory”). 
8 Section 271(f)(2) of the U.S. Patent Act provides: 
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States 
any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for 
use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for sub-
stantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part, 
knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component 
will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent 
if such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2018). For further discussion, see infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.   
9 Id. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
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conduct in violation of section 271(a)—or, to put it another way, that such 
sales should be considered a cognizable harm under U.S. patent law10—
subject, however, to three important limiting principles. Application of 
these principles should enable courts to avoid the parade of horribles that 
some commentators, including the dissenting justices in WesternGeco,11 
fear will result from any slackening of the territoriality principle.      
The first limiting principle is that the domestic infringement must 
be the cause-in-fact (or “but-for” cause) of any extraterritorial sales that 
allegedly harm the patent owner or benefit the infringer.12 While this re-
quirement might seem obvious, in the present context it means that, if the 
defendant could have avoided the predicate act of infringing the U.S. pa-
tent by engaging in the very same conduct outside the United States, then, 
as a matter of economic logic, the domestic infringement is not a cause-
in-fact of the extraterritorial sales. In the Starchild hypothetical, for ex-
ample, if Big Bang could have avoided infringing the U.S. patent by shift-
ing its manufacturing operations to Canada (or some other country), such 
outsourcing should count as a noninfringing alternative that breaks the 
causal chain between the actual (U.S.) infringement and the foreign sales. 
In such a case, the patent owner’s damages should consist only of a rea-
sonable royalty capped by the value (e.g., lower labor or transportation 
costs, if any) the defendant derived from domestic, as opposed to foreign, 
production.13   
Second, even if the domestic infringement is the cause-in-fact of 
foreign sales, the patent owner cannot recover damages reflecting those 
sales unless the sales also are proximately caused by the domestic in-
fringement.14 Under conventional tort law principles, this means that 
courts should reject claims for damages reflecting extraterritorial sales 
that are “unforeseeable,” “indirect,” “remote,” “speculative,” or barred 
for “policy considerations.”15 To be sure, these terms are hardly self-de-
fining; but one can look to other patent and commercial law cases for 
guidance, and this Article will argue that, contrary to the views of some 
commentators, there is nothing inherently unforeseeable, indirect, re-
mote, or speculative about foreign sales tied to domestic infringement, 
 
 
10 See infra Section II.A. From time to time, this Article also will note how U.S. courts have ad-
dressed the issue of extraterritorial damages in copyright law. For a fuller discussion, however, see 
Thomas F. Cotter, Extraterritorial Damages in Copyright Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author).  
11 See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2139–44 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
12 See infra Section II.B. 
13 See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra Section II.C. 
15 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 
71 (2001) (“Courts frequently state that the proximate cause doctrine screens out claims that are 
‘unforeseeable,’ ‘indirect,’ ‘remote,’ ‘speculative,’ or barred for ‘policy considerations,’ without 
much analysis beyond the use of these conclusory terms.”) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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and no sound public policy reason for categorically excluding them from 
consideration.   
The third limiting principle is that courts should not compensate pa-
tent owners twice for the same loss. Fortunately, courts have considerable 
experience applying what is known in common law countries as the “sin-
gle recovery” rule (or “rule against double recovery”).16 Thus, even if Big 
Bang’s Canadian sales were both caused-in-fact and proximately caused 
by its infringing U.S. manufacturer, a U.S. court should reduce the lost 
profits award on the Canadian sales by the amount (if any) that a Cana-
dian court already has awarded Starchild for the infringement of its cor-
responding Canadian patent (if any).17 Note that if the shoe were on the 
other foot, it is likely that a Canadian court would do precisely the same 
thing—as in fact, one Canadian court has done in an analogous case in 
which it was the corresponding U.S. litigation that terminated first.18  
Part I provides an overview of the case law on extraterritorial dam-
ages, from the mid-nineteenth century through WesternGeco and subse-
quent lower court decisions. Part II discusses why, both as a matter of 
doctrine and policy, courts should award damages for extraterritorial 
losses caused by domestic infringement, but only subject to the three lim-
iting principles set forth above. Part III illustrates the application of these 
principles with reference to several hypothetical cases. A brief conclusion 
follows.      
I. CASE LAW 
Oddly enough, what may well be the first decision anywhere to ex-
press approval for awarding extraterritorial damages for domestic in-
fringement is also the foundational case establishing the principle that 
patents are territorial rights: Brown v. Duchesne.19 Plaintiff John Brown, 
inventor of a patented “gaff saddle”—“a curved piece of wood or plate 
of metal that partially wraps around the mast of a ship and supports a gaff, 
or small boom, at the top of a four-sided sail”20—filed suit against the 
 
 
16 See e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 170 P.2d 448, 452 (Cal. 1946) (Traynor, J., dissenting) 
(stating that “[w]hen the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury done him, from 
whatever source it may come, he is so far affected in equity and good conscience, that the law will 
not permit him to recover again for the same damages,” and that “the rule against double recovery 
is aimed at preventing unjust enrichment”) (internal quotations omitted); see also infra notes 191, 
197–198 and accompanying text. 
17 See supra note 2 (noting the possibility that Starchild might have a corresponding Canadian pa-
tent).  
18 See infra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
19 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183 (1856).   
20 John H. Evans, National Steel Car Ltd. v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd.: International Com-
merce and Exemption from Patent Infringement, 46 JURIMETRICS 459, 461 n.10 (2006) (citing THE 
OXFORD COMPANION TO SHIPS AND THE SEA 333–34 (Peter Kemp ed., 1976) and Mode of Con-
structing Gafts [sic] of Sail Vessels, U.S. Patent No. 1,060 (issued Dec. 31, 1838)). Although the 
opinion does not mention the patent number of the patent in suit, the patent Evans cites is for a gaff 
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captain of a French schooner that was temporarily in port in Boston Har-
bor, alleging that the schooner made use of Brown’s patented invention. 
The lower court dismissed the action21 and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney began by asserting that Con-
gress’s power to grant patents “is domestic in its character, and neces-
sarily confined within the limits of the United States.”22 From this prin-
ciple, he further inferred that the Constitution “confers no power on 
Congress to regulate commerce, or the vehicles of commerce, which be-
long to a foreign nation, and occasionally visit our ports in their commer-
cial pursuits,” and thus concluded that the vessel’s temporary presence in 
the United States did not give rise to a claim for patent infringement.23 
More precisely, the Court noted that the ship “could hardly be said to use 
[the invention] while she was at anchor in the port, or lay at the wharf,” 
and that “the only use made of it, which can be supposed to interfere with 
the rights of the plaintiff, was in navigating the vessel into and out of the 
harbor, when she arrived or was about to depart, and while she was within 
the jurisdiction of the United States.”24 Brushing aside the textualist ar-
gument that this use was, nevertheless, an act of infringement,25 the Court 
also observed that any damage sustained by the plaintiff from this domes-
tic activity would have been de minimis.26 The principal use of the 
 
 
saddle, and the inventor is John Brown. 
21 Brown v. Duchesne, 4 F. Cas. 369 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).   
22 Brown, 60 U.S. at 195. For discussion and criticism of various rationales in support of the general 
presumption that statutes do not apply extraterritorially (international law, international comity, 
choice-of-law principles, likely congressional intent, and separation-of-powers considerations), see 
Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 505, 513–19 (1997).   
23 Brown, 60 U.S. at 195, 198–99. The temporary presence exception is now codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 272 (2018). 
24 Brown, 60 U.S. at 196. 
25 The Court stated: 
The general words used in the clause of the patent laws granting the exclusive right 
to the patentee to use the improvement, taken by themselves, and literally construed, 
without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of the plaintiff. 
But this mode of expounding a statute has never been adopted by any enlightened tribu-
nal—because it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the object which the Leg-
islature intended to accomplish. 
Id. at 194. Furthermore: 
[S]uch a construction would be inconsistent with the principles that lie at the foundation 
of these laws; and instead of conferring legal rights on the inventor, in order to do equal 
justice between him and those who profit by his invention, they would confer a power 
to exact damages where no real damage had been sustained, and would moreover seri-
ously embarrass the commerce of the country with foreign nations. We think these laws 
ought to be construed in the spirit in which they were made—that is, as founded in jus-
tice—and should not be strained by technical constructions to reach cases which Con-
gress evidently could not have contemplated, without departing from the principle upon 
which they were legislating, and going far beyond the object they intended to accom-
plish.   
Id. at 197. 
26 See id. at 196. 
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invention would have been at sea, but any such use would not be “an 
infringement of [the owner’s] rights, and [the owner] has no claim to any 
compensation for the profit or advantage the party may derive from it.”27 
The Court nevertheless immediately qualified the preceding lan-
guage by suggesting, in dictum, that the case would come out differently 
if the defendant had made or sold the invention while in Boston, for later 
use outside the United States: 
The chief and almost only advantage which the defendant de-
rived from the use of this improvement was on the high seas, and in 
other places out of the jurisdiction of the United States. The plea avers 
that it was placed on her to fit her for sea. If it had been manufactured 
on her deck while she was lying in the port of Boston, or if the captain 
had sold it there, he would undoubtedly have trespassed upon the 
rights of the plaintiff, and would have been justly answerable for the 
profit and advantage he thereby obtained. For, by coming in competi-
tion with the plaintiff, where the plaintiff was entitled to the exclusive 
use, he thereby diminished the value of his property. Justice, therefore, 
as well as the act of Congress, would require that he should compen-
sate the patentee for the injury he sustained, and the benefit and ad-
vantage which he (the defendant) derived from the invention.28 
Though not controlling in Brown, Taney’s dictum is consistent with 
views expressed in two subsequent Supreme Court opinions from the late 
nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, Goulds’ Manufacturing Co. v. 
Cowing29 and Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow 
Co.30 In Goulds’ Manufacturing, the defendant made and sold 298 pumps 
that were used for extracting gas from oil wells, which infringed the 
plaintiff’s patent.31 The defendant’s customers were located in Pennsyl-
vania and Canada.32 The Supreme Court reversed an award of the defend-
ant’s profits33 on the ground that the master had erroneously excluded 
 
 
27 Id. at 195–96.   
28 Id. at 196. Dissenting in WesternGeco, Justice Gorsuch simply ignores this language about the 
possible consequences of extraterritorial use following domestic manufacture or sale, writing that 
the “Court proceeded to explain that the ‘only use’ of the invention that might require compensation 
was ‘in navigating the vessel into and out of [Boston] harbor, . . . while she was within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States,’” and that “[w]ith respect to uses outside the United States, the Court 
made clear that ‘compensation’ was unavailable.” WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 
138 S. Ct. 2129, 2140 n.1 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown, 60 U.S. at 195–96) 
(emphasis and omissions in original). 
29 Goulds’ Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253 (1881).   
30 Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641 (1915). 
31 See Goulds’ Mfg., 105 U.S. at 254. 
32 See id. at 256. 
33 See id. at 256–58. Prior to 1946, the owner of a U.S. utility patent could recover an award of the 
infringer’s profits, in lieu of its own lost profits or a reasonable royalty, in an action for infringe-
ment. See Christopher B. Seaman, Thomas F. Cotter, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse & Masa-
bumi Suzuki, Lost Profits and Disgorgement, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: 
TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 50, 74–75 (C. Bradford Biddle et al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter 
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some of the relevant costs, and, rather than remanding for a recalculation, 
the Court itself determined that the defendant had made a $15 profit on 
each of the 298 pumps and awarded that amount—$4,470.34 This amount 
necessarily included the profit made on sales to the Canadian customers, 
though as others have observed, the opinion does not indicate whether the 
sales to the Canadian customers were concluded in the United States or 
Canada.35 Similarly, in Dowagiac, the defendants had purchased infring-
ing drills from third-party manufacturers and then resold them to custom-
ers in both the United States and Canada.36 The Court rejected the plain-
tiff’s claim to profits from the Canadian sales, but in doing so 
distinguished Goulds’ Manufacturing on the following grounds: 
Some of the drills, about 261, sold by the defendants, were sold 
in Canada, no part of the transaction occurring within the United 
States, and as to them there could be no recovery of either profits or 
damages. The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to 
the United States and its territories, and infringement of this right can-
not be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country. 
The case of Goulds’ Mfg. Co. v. Cowing is cited as holding oth-
erwise, but is not in point. There the defendant made the infringing 
articles in the United States. Here, while they were made in the United 
States, they were not made by the defendants. The latter’s infringe-
ment consisted only in selling the drills after they passed out of the 
makers’ hands. The place of sale is therefore of controlling importance 
here.37 
All three cases, then, seemed premised on the understanding that, if the 
defendant makes the infringing products in the United States, the plaintiff 
can recover the profit the defendant thereafter earns on both domestic and 
foreign sales.    
A small number of lower court decisions from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries also appear consistent with this rule. In K.W. Ignition 
Co. v. Temco Electric Motor Co., for example, the Sixth Circuit cited 
 
 
COMPLEX PRODUCTS]. This remedy remains available today for the infringement of design patents 
and for other forms of intellectual property, but (in the United States) not for utility patents. Id. at 
75 (citing, inter alia, 35 U.S.C. § 289 and Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429 
(2016)); Pamela Samuelson, John M. Golden & Mark P. Gergen, Recalibrating the Disgorgement 
Remedy in Intellectual Property Cases, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1999 (2020). 
34 See Goulds’ Mfg., 105 U.S. at 257–58. 
35 See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2141 n.2 (2018) (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the opinion does not say “whether the Canada-bound products were 
actually sold in Canada (as opposed, say, to Canadian buyers in the United States)”). As noted 
above, however, the Court in Dowagiac appears to understand the result in Goulds’ Manufacturing 
as resting on the fact that the infringing articles were made in the United States. See also infra note 
39 and accompanying text. 
36 See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 643, 650 (1915). 
37 Id. at 650 (citations omitted). 
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Dowagiac in holding that the plaintiff could recover a royalty for sales 
the defendants made to foreign customers, stating, “[D]efendants would 
be equally liable whether the absorbers were sold abroad or here, they 
having been manufactured in the United States.”38 Similarly, in Ketchum 
Harvester Co. v. Johnson Harvester Co., a case decided just a few months 
before Goulds’ Manufacturing, the court stated: 
Although the patent could give no protection abroad in the sale of ma-
chines abroad, it gave protection in the United States in making ma-
chines in the United States for sale abroad. The patent prevented all 
persons but the patentee from making in the United States. The privi-
lege of making in the United States, for sale abroad, was valuable, as 
was shown by the fact that the defendant made in the United States for 
sale abroad. The plaintiff was entitled to that privilege exclusively, 
and to damages for its violation. It may be that in the case of manu-
facture in the United States, without sale anywhere, nominal damages 
only are to be allowed; but where such manufacture is followed by 
sale abroad, it cannot be said that the damages ought to be only nom-
inal. It is true that the sale is the fruition, and gives the profit, and that 
the sale is abroad, and the patent does not cover the sale abroad. But 
the unlawful act of making is made hurtful by a sale, wherever made.39 
Later in the century, even the Federal Circuit, in a series of decisions from 
the 1980s and 1990s, appeared to agree.40   
U.S. copyright case law has, for the most part, followed a similar 
path. The leading decision is Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Sheldon 
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., a case probably better known for its 
discussion of how to apportion the defendant’s profit from the unauthor-
ized use of copyrightable material.41 Among the many subsidiary issues 
was whether the defendants would be required to turn over the (appor-
tioned) profit they earned from exhibiting an infringing film outside the 
 
 
38 K.W. Ignition Co. v. Temco Elec. Motor Co., 283 F. 873, 879–80 (6th Cir. 1922). 
39 Ketchum Harvester Co. v. Johnson Harvester Co., 8 F. 586, 586–87 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1881). Cu-
riously, the plaintiff sought damages only for one-half of the foreign sales, leading the court to 
characterize this result as  
very liberal to the defendant. It is all the plaintiff asks, and is not to be regarded as es-
tablishing the rule that the same damages would not be proper for machines sold abroad 
and for machines sold here both being unlawfully made. The act of making, in either 
case, is necessary to enable the sale to be made; and, the making being unlawful, it is no 
injustice to attribute to the unlawful act all the consequences which flow from it. 
Id. at 587. 
40 Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Sys., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(per curiam) (lost profits on foreign sales of infringing products manufactured in the United States); 
Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reasonable royalty on 
foreign sales); Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 652–54 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (lost profits on foreign sales); R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 
1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (lost profits on foreign sales of infringing products manufactured in the 
United States). 
41 See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48–51 (2d Cir. 1939). 
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United States. While conceding that the foreign exhibition itself was not 
a violation of U.S. law, the court, citing Goulds’ Manufacturing, never-
theless concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to an apportionable share 
of these profits because they were the result of an infringing reproduction 
that occurred in the United States.42 Other federal courts have subse-
quently endorsed the doctrine.43 The Ninth Circuit, however, has limited 
the predicate act doctrine to cases (like Sheldon) in which the plaintiff 
seeks to recover the infringer’s profits,44 though it is not apparent that 
there is any relevant economic distinction between such cases and those 
in which the plaintiff seeks instead its own lost profit (or a reasonable 
royalty or statutory damages), as long as the benefit or loss occurring 
abroad was enabled by the domestic infringement.45          
 
 
42 The court reasoned: 
The Culver Company made the negatives in this country, or had them made here, and 
shipped them abroad, where the positives were produced and exhibited. The negatives 
were “records” from which the work could be “reproduced”, and it was a tort to make 
them in this country. The plaintiffs acquired an equitable interest in them as soon as they 
were made, which attached to any profits from their exploitation, whether in the form of 
money remitted to the United States, or of increase in the value of shares of foreign 
companies held by the defendants.  
Id. at 52. 
43 See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998); 
Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292, 306–09 (4th Cir. 
2012) (per curiam); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1988); 
Motorola Sols., Inc. v. Hytera Commc’ns Corp., 436 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1167–68 (N.D. Ill. 2020); 
ICONICS, Inc. v. Massaro, 192 F. Supp. 3d 254, 262–63 (D. Mass. 2016); Compaq Comput. Corp. 
v. Ergonome Inc., No. 4:97-cv-01026, 2001 WL 34104827, at *3–5 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2001); 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 684, 691 (E.D. Mich. 1996); P & 
D Int’l v. Halsey Publ’g Co., 672 F. Supp. 1429, 1432–33 (S.D. Fla. 1987). Other cases have 
acknowledged the doctrine but found it inapposite on the facts. See, e.g., Rundquist v. Vapiano SE, 
798 F. Supp. 2d. 102, 122–25 (D.D.C. 2011). 
44 L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 340 F.3d 926, 931–32 (9th Cir. 2003). The 
court stated that “the Sheldon constructive trust rationale includes a territorial connection that pre-
serves consistency with Congress’s decision to keep the copyright laws . . . territorially confined.” 
Id. at 931 (citation omitted). Additionally, 
no rational deterrent function is served by making an infringer whose domestic act of 
infringement—from which he earns no profit—leads to widespread extraterritorial in-
fringement, liable for the copyright owner’s entire loss of value or profit from that over-
seas infringement, particularly if the overseas infringement is legal where it takes place. 
Id. Contra id. at 932–33 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no logical basis for reach-
ing a different result when the plaintiff seeks lost profits as opposed to infringer’s profits); WILLIAM 
F. PATRY, 7 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, § 25:89 n.2 (rev. ed. 2020) (noting that the overdeterrence 
concern could just as easily apply to awards of the infringer’s profits). 
45 In many of the copyright predicate act cases, the plaintiff either was requesting an award of 
profits or the court did not specify what type of relief the plaintiff was seeking. There are a few, 
however, in which courts awarded royalties under a compulsory license. See Famous Music Corp. 
v. Seeco Recs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 560, 568–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia 
Gramophone Co., 270 F. 822, 824–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). For actual damages, see Liberty Media 
Holdings, LLC v. Vinigay.com, No. 2:11-cv-00280, 2011 WL 7430062, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 
2011); see also Randles Films, LLC v. Quantum Releasing, LLC, 551 Fed. App’x 370, 370–71 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential opinion) (affirming judgment that plaintiff could recover actual dam-
ages from reduction in value of worldwide distribution rights stemming from an act of domestic 
infringement). 
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Case law from other countries also appears consistent with these 
U.S. decisions. For example, in AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 
the defendant made generic omeprazole (a pharmaceutical product) in 
Canada, and then sold some of its product in Canada and some in the 
United States.46 The plaintiffs, which owned relevant patents in both Can-
ada and the United States, pursued infringement litigation in both coun-
tries.47 The U.S. litigation ended first, with the court ordering Apotex to 
pay AstraZeneca $76 million for the unlawful sales of the drugs in the 
United States.48 AstraZeneca thereafter prevailed in the Canadian litiga-
tion as well, and the Canadian court ordered Apotex to disgorge the profit 
it made from unauthorized sales in both countries, minus the reasonable 
royalty damages that the U.S. court had awarded for the infringement of 
the corresponding U.S. patent.49 There also are two recent Japanese cases 
awarding damages for extraterritorial losses resulting from the infringing 
manufacture in Japan,50 and one (albeit rather old) English case stating 
that the patent owner was entitled to recover the defendant’s profits from 
the sales of products in Austria, where the defendant had manufactured 
those products in England.51 In addition, there is at least one German cop-
yright decision awarding damages for losses incurred abroad as a result 
of domestic infringement.52  
 
 
46 AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Apotex Inc. [2017] F.C. 726, paras. 1, 234, 245 (Can. Ont.), https://de-
cisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/235832/1/document.do [https://perma.cc/JVC2-G42P]. 
47 Id. para. 244. 
48 See Astrazeneca AB v. Apotex Corp., 985 F. Supp. 2d 452, 497, 503–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, and remanded, 782 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
49 AstraZeneca Can., [2017] F.C. 726, para. 253; see also Apotex Inc. v. ADIR, [2018] F.C. 346 
(Can. Ont.), https://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/item/308630/index.do [https://perma 
.cc/Z2WS-3VW7] (reaffirming earlier judgment awarding the infringer’s profit on foreign sales 
caused by infringing domestic manufacture of perindopril); Varco Can. Ltd. v. Pason Sys. Corp., 
[2013] F.C. 750, paras. 415, 426, 468 (Can. Ont.), https://www.ippractice.ca/files/2013FC750.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4AY-2H3E] (awarding the infringer’s profits, or, in the alternative, actual dam-
ages, based, in part, on rental income the defendant earned from rentals outside of Canada); Al-
liedsignal Inc. v. du Pont Can. Inc., [1998] CanLII 7464, paras. 5, 29–31, 33, 278 (Can. Ont., F.C.), 
http://canlii.ca/t/4cf8 [https://perma.cc/3WVW-VPBK] (stating that the “patentee has a right to be 
compensated for all damages flowing from the infringement of the patent within Canada, which 
may include profits lost on sales outside Canada,” and awarding lost profits deriving from Canadian 
manufacture of infringing products sold primarily to U.S. companies), aff’d, [1999] CanLII 7409 
(Can. Ont., F.C.), http://canlii.ca/t/4m49 [https://perma.cc/TP8C-K95M].  
50 See Osaka Chihō Saibansho [Osaka Dist. Ct.] Jan. 28, 2010, no. 2007 (Wa) 2076, 
https://www.ip.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_en/584/000584.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LCQ-N7B] 
(Japan); Tokyo Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Sept. 25, 2013, no. 2010 (Wa) 17810, 
https://www.ip.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_en/014/001014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL8U-QT47] 
(Japan); Chiteki Zaisan Kōtō Saibansho [Intell. Prop. High Ct.] Dec. 4, 2014, no. 2013 (Ne) 10103, 
https://www.ip.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_en/829/001829.pdf [https://perma.cc/435V-8BQR] 
(Japan); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Damages for Extraterritorial Injuries in Japanese Patent Law, 
COMPAR. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Feb. 18, 2019), http://comparativepatentremedies.blog-
spot.com/2019/02/damages-for-extraterritorial-injuries.html [https://perma.cc/3MBS-HTJE]. 
51 Goucher v. Clayton, [1865] 11 Jur. (N.S.) 462. Goucher is cited as persuasive authority in one 
old U.S. copyright case that anticipated the predicate act doctrine. Fishel v. Lueckel, 53 F. 499, 501 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892). 
52 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Fed. Ct. of Just.] Feb. 6, 1976, I ZR 110/74, Wolters Kluwer (Ger.), 
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The Federal Circuit took a different tack, however, in a trilogy of 
cases decided after 2010. First, in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild 
Semiconductor International, Inc., a case involving patents relating to 
power supplies for electronics, the court broadly stated that “entirely ex-
traterritorial production, use, or sale of an invention patented in the 
United States is an independent, intervening act that, under almost all cir-
cumstances, cuts off the chain of causation initiated by an act of domestic 
infringement.”53 Neither the appellate nor the district court opinion is al-
together clear about what exactly the connection was between the defend-
ant’s domestic infringement and the profits the plaintiff allegedly lost 
overseas.54 Power Integrations’ appellate brief, however, indicates that 
the company’s theory was that, but for Fairchild’s domestic manufacture 
of infringing semiconductor chips, Power Integrations would have made 
additional sales to Samsung, both within and outside the United States.55 
The Federal Circuit nevertheless concluded that U.S. patent law provided 
no remedy for these extraterritorial losses.56 
The second case was WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical 
Corp.57 WesternGeco owned four patents on a system for surveying the 




visited Mar. 4, 2021) (where the defendant made infringing “Hummel” sculptural works in Ger-
many and exported them to the United States, the copyright owner could recover damages for the 
royalties it would have earned on sales by its authorized U.S. licensee); see also Thomas F. Cotter, 
Damages for Extraterritorial Harms in Germany and the U.S., COMPAR. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG 
(May 3, 2018), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2018/05/damages-for-extraterrito-
rial-harms-in.html [https://perma.cc/VCU8-92WY].  
53 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
54 See id. at 1369–81 (discussing, among other matters, Fairchild’s manufacture and sale of mer-
chandise within the United States); Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 
589 F. Supp. 2d 505, 509–12 (D. Del. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded, 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
55 Bernard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 77, 80 & n.12 (2014) (citing 
Non-Confidential Brief for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Power Integrations, Inc. at 20, Power Integra-
tions, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Nos. 2011-1218, 2011-1238), 
2011 WL 2827447 [hereinafter PI Brief]) (stating that “Power Integrations[] argued that but for 
Fairchild’s U.S. infringement, Fairchild would not have been able to make its foreign sales,” be-
cause “customers were interested in using the same semiconductor chips in their products . . . eve-
rywhere in the world”); Stephen Yelderman, Proximate vs. Geographic Limits on Patent Damages, 
7 IP THEORY, no. 2, 2018, at 1, 10, https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar-
ticle=1043&context=ipt [https://perma.cc/NY5Z-8R7Q] (citing PI Brief at 44) (stating that Power 
Integrations “argued that the defendant could not have made any foreign sales without the infring-
ing domestic sales on the theory that most customers would insist on using the same chip in all their 
devices throughout the world”); see also WesternGeco L.L.C. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 791 F.3d 
1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“If the accused infringer had been precluded from U.S. infringement, 
the patentee alleged that the accused infringer could not have competed for the contracts which 
necessarily involved supplying chips both in the United States and abroad.”), vacated sub nom. 
WesternGeco LLC. v. ION Geophysical Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016).   
56 See Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1371–72. 
57 WesternGeco, 791 F.3d 1340.  
58 Id. at 1343. Some of the claims at issue were invalidated in subsequent proceedings. See West-
ernGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 889 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2018). After the Supreme Court 
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§ 271(f)(2)—which forbids the export of a component of a patented in-
vention if it is “especially made or especially adapted for use in the in-
vention” and the defendant both knows that the “component is so made 
or adapted” and intends that it “will be combined outside of the United 
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination oc-
curred within the United States”59—ION exported components of West-
ernGeco’s patented system to customers outside the United States.60 The 
customers in turn allegedly combined the components to provide survey-
ing services to oil companies at sea, thus depriving WesternGeco of the 
profits that it would have made from providing those services.61 Once 
again, the Federal Circuit concluded that the recovery of damages for ex-
traterritorial losses would violate the presumption against extraterritori-
ality, stating that “[u]nder Power Integrations, WesternGeco cannot re-
cover lost profits resulting from its failure to win foreign service 
contracts, the failure of which allegedly resulted from ION’s supplying 
infringing products to WesternGeco’s competitors.”62   
In dissent, Judge Wallach argued that this result was contrary to 
Duchesne, Goulds’ Manufacturing, and Dowagiac.63 In response, the ma-
jority acknowledged that these cases “suggest that profits for foreign sales 
of the patented items themselves are recoverable when the items in ques-
tion were manufactured in the United States and sold to foreign buyers 
by the U.S. manufacturer,” but noted that “[t]here is no such claim 
here.”64 However, the court did not explain why that distinction was a 
 
 
reversed the panel decision on extraterritorial damages, discussed infra notes 76–82 and accompa-
nying text, the Federal Circuit remanded for the district court to determine if the invalidation of 
some of the claims in suit would have any effect on WesternGeco’s claim for lost profits. Western-
Geco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 913 F.3d 1067 (Fed. Cir. 2019).  
59 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2018). Section 271(f)(1) forbids the export of  
all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such com-
ponents are uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the 
combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner that would 
infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States . . . . 
Id. § 271(f)(1). Both provisions were enacted in 1984 to plug a perceived loophole under which 
such exportation was held not to violate U.S. patent law. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437, 442–45 (2007) (explaining that Congress enacted section 271(f) to overrule 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding that the export of compo-
nents from the United States, with the intention that the foreign purchasers would combine them in 
a manner that would infringe the U.S. patent if the combination occurred within the United States, 
did not infringe the U.S. patent)). 
60 Although the majority opinion is not exactly clear on this point, the dissenting opinion and the 
parties’ briefs explain that ION supplied two components of the invention from the United States 
to overseas locations. WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1354, 1358 (Wallach, J., dissenting); Reply Brief 
for Petitioner at 6, 23, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 
16-1011), 2018 WL 1733140; Brief for Respondent at 6–8, WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129 (No. 16-
1011), 2018 WL 1517869. 
61 See WesternGeco, 791 F.3d at 1349. 
62 Id. at 1351. 
63 Id. at 1354, 1356–57, 1362 (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 1352. 
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relevant one in a case brought under section 271(f). The majority also 
found irrelevant the dissenting judge’s concern that, because the use of 
the patented system occurred in international waters, WesternGeco would 
be left without an effective remedy.65   
Eventually, WesternGeco had an opportunity to argue the issue be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court,66 but first there was one more Federal Cir-
cuit decision on extraterritorial damages—Carnegie Mellon University v. 
Marvell Technology Group.67 The defendant in Carnegie Mellon had 
used the plaintiff’s patented technology relating to hard-disk drives dur-
ing “sales cycles” that occurred in the United States; this use, in turn, 
allegedly induced both domestic and foreign customers to buy Marvell’s 
infringing chips.68 The district court awarded a fifty-cent-per-unit royalty 
for each domestic and foreign sale on the theory that this is what Carnegie 
Mellon would have agreed to, had Marvell sought permission to use the 
technology at the domestic sales cycle.69 The Federal Circuit disapproved 
of the royalty for foreign sales, however, stating: 
In the lost-profits context, this court indicated in Power Integrations 
that, where the direct measure of damages was foreign activity (i.e., 
making, using, selling outside § 271(a)), it was not enough, given the 
required strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality, that the 
damages-measuring foreign activity have been factually caused, in the 
ordinary sense, by domestic activity constituting infringement under 
§ 271(a). We think that the presumption against extraterritoriality, to 
be given its due, requires something similar in the present royalty 
 
 
65 Id.; see also id. at 1360–61 (Wallach, J., dissenting). 
66 WesternGeco first filed a petition for a rehearing en banc, which the Federal Circuit rejected. 
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 621 Fed. App’x 663 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
Judge Wallach dissented again, noting this time, in addition, some of the copyright case law dis-
cussed supra notes 41–43. WesternGeco, 621 Fed. App’x. at 664 (Wallach, J., dissenting) (citing 
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1939); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters 
Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 1998); Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong 
Linglong Rubber Co., 682 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ’g, 
Ltd., 843 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1988)). WesternGeco filed a petition for certiorari presenting two ques-
tions, one related to extraterritorial damages and the other to enhanced damages. Petition for Cer-
tiorari, at i–ii, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (No. 15-1085), 
2016 WL 792196. The Supreme Court granted the writ, vacated the judgment, and remanded the 
case for further consideration in light of an intervening decision, Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., 
Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016), addressing willful infringement and enhanced damages. WesternGeco, 
LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (mem.). On remand, the Federal Circuit 
panel entered a judgment remanding to the district court for further consideration of the willful 
infringement issue and reinstating its (the Federal Circuit’s) judgment as to extraterritorial dam-
ages. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 837 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Judge Wallach 
dissented again on the extraterritoriality issue. Id. at 1364–69 (Wallach, J., dissenting). Western-
Geco then filed a petition for certiorari limited to the extraterritorial damages question, Petition for 
Certiorari, at i, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 16-
1011), 2017 WL 678358, which the Supreme Court granted, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophys-
ical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 734 (2018) (mem.).     
67 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., 807 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
68 Id. at 1309–10. 
69 See id. at 1288, 1291–92, 1303–05. 
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setting. Although all of Marvell’s sales are strongly enough tied to its 
domestic infringement as a causation matter to have been part of the 
hypothetical-negotiation agreement, that conclusion is not enough to 
use the sales as a direct measure of the royalty except as to sales that 
are domestic (where there is no domestic making or using and no im-
porting). As a practical matter, given the ease of finding cross-border 
causal connections, anything less would make too little of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality that must inform our application of 
the patent laws to damages.70 
By 2018, the Supreme Court was ready to consider WesternGeco. 
Taking a different approach from the Federal Circuit, the majority opin-
ion (authored by Justice Thomas) anchors its reasoning in the Court’s 
non-patent law jurisprudence on extraterritoriality—most importantly, its 
2016 decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,71 which ap-
plied a two-step framework to determine the territorial reach of the fed-
eral racketeering statute. Under this framework, and in view of the gen-
eral presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritorially, the 
first step requires consideration of whether the statutory text provides a 
“clear indication” rebutting that presumption.72 Absent such an indica-
tion, the Court would then move on to the second step of considering 
“whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute.”73 This 
step requires “identifying the statute’s ‘focus’ and asking whether the 
conduct relevant to that focus occurred in United States territory. If it did, 
then the case involves a permissible domestic application of the 
 
 
70 Id. at 1307 (citations omitted). The court’s reference to “the hypothetical negotiation agreement” 
reflects a common approach to calculating reasonable royalties, which involves attempting to con-
struct the ex ante bargain the parties themselves would have struck for the use of the plaintiff’s 
technology, had the defendant not infringed. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 
F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 
1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)) (stating that “the hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-
willing licensee’ approach[ ] attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have 
agreed had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began,” recreating 
“as best as possible . . . the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and . . . the resulting agreement”); 
Thomas F. Cotter, John M. Golden, Oskar Liivak, Brian J. Love, Norman V. Siebrasse, Masabumi 
Suzuki & David O. Taylor, Reasonable Royalties, in COMPLEX PRODUCTS, supra note 33, at 6, 
16–21 [hereinafter Cotter et al., Reasonable Royalties] (discussing the hypothetical negotiation ap-
proach and alternatives to it). From an economic perspective, one would expect the royalty to reflect 
some portion of the incremental value (that is, additional profits or reduced costs) that the defendant 
anticipated deriving from the use of the patented technology over the next-best available nonin-
fringing alternative. Id. at 16 (stating that “[a] license for the use . . . of a patented technology typ-
ically requires the licensee to share with the licensor some portion of the incremental value the 
licensee derives or expects to derive from the use of that technology”). 
71 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). In RJR Nabisco, the Court 
concluded that Congress intended for some of the substantive provisions of the Racketeering Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act to apply extraterritorially. Id. at 2101–05. A 4–3 
majority of the Court, however, concluded that a person can assert a private right of action under 
RICO only for injuries to domestic business or property. Id. at 2106–11.  
72 See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018) (quoting Mor-
rison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)). 
73 Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101). 
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statute.”74 Moreover, although one would normally expect courts to apply 
the two steps sequentially, it is permissible to begin the analysis at step 
two “if addressing step one would require resolving difficult questions 
that do not change the outcome of the case but could have far-reaching 
effects in future cases.”75 
Applying this framework, the Court skipped over step one out of 
concern that holding the presumption against extraterritoriality never to 
apply “to statutes, such as section 284, that merely provide a general dam-
ages remedy for conduct that Congress has declared unlawful” might 
“implicate many other statutes besides the Patent Act.”76 The Court there-
fore began at step two, identifying the statute’s “focus.”77 To identify the 
focus of section 284, the Court looked first to the statutory text, which 
states that “the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to com-
pensate for the infringement”78 and concluded that “the infringement is 
the focus of this statute.”79 “To determine the focus of § 284 in a given 
case,” however, the court “must look to the type of infringement that oc-
curred.”80 Here, because “[t]he conduct that § 271(f)(2) regulates—i.e., 
its focus—is the domestic act of suppl[ying] in or from the United 
States,” the Court concluded “the focus of § 284, in a case involving in-
fringement under § 271(f)(2), is on the act of exporting components from 
the United States. . . . Thus, the lost-profits damages that were awarded 
to WesternGeco were a domestic application of § 284.”81 In a footnote, 
however, the Court noted that it was “not address[ing] the extent to which 
other doctrines, such as proximate cause, could limit or preclude damages 
in particular cases.”82 
 
 
74 Id. (quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101) (internal quotations omitted). Further describing a 
statute’s focus as “the objec[t] of [its] solicitude, which can include the conduct it seeks to regulate, 
as well as the parties and interests it seeks to protec[t] or vindicate,” the Court stated that “[i]f the 
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States, then the case involves a per-
missible domestic application of the statute, even if other conduct occurred abroad,” whereas if it 
“occurred in another country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application 
regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.” Id. at 2137 (first quoting Morrison, 
561 U.S. at 267; then quoting RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101) (internal quotations omitted) (first, 
second, and third alterations in original). Note that some commentators have critiqued the focus 
test as being unduly subjective. See, e.g., Julie Rose O’Sullivan, The Extraterritorial Application 
of Federal Criminal Statutes: Analytical Roadmap, Normative Conclusions, and a Plea to Con-
gress for Direction, 106 GEO. L.J. 1021, 1095 (2018); Kyle A. Mason, Note, The “Presumption 
Against Extra(Subjective)Territoriality”: Morrison’s Confounding “Focus” Test, 38 REV. LITIG. 
385 (2019). 
75 WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2136 (internal quotations omitted). 
76 Id. at 2136–37. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 2137 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018)). 
79 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
80 Id. (emphasis added). 
81 Id. at 2138 (internal quotations omitted). 
82 Id. at 2139 n.3. 
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Dissenting, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Breyer, asserted 
that because acts occurring outside the United States do not infringe U.S. 
patents, section 284 provides no remedy for such losses.83 Justice Gor-
such also expressed concern that “[p]ermitting damages of this sort would 
effectively allow U.S. patent owners to use American courts to extend 
their monopolies to foreign markets” and that this, “in turn, would invite 
other countries to use their own patent laws and courts to assert control 
over our economy.”84 Justice Gorsuch also suggested that “supplying a 
single infringing product from the United States would make ION respon-
sible for any foreseeable harm its customers cause by using the product 
to compete against WesternGeco worldwide.”85 For reasons discussed in 
Part II, it seems unlikely that Justice Gorsuch’s hypothetical would lead 
to the result he envisions.86 Before taking that matter up, however, this 
Part will note the handful of U.S. decisions post-WesternGeco that have 
considered whether the statute applies to infringement under section 
271(a).   
Curiously enough, the first such case was Power Integrations itself, 
in which the patent owner sought relief from the earlier judgment in view 
of WesternGeco.87 The district court agreed that WesternGeco “implicitly 
overruled the Federal Circuit’s Power Integrations opinion,”88 stating: 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the patent damages statute, § 284, 
has equal applicability to the direct infringement allegations pending 
here, as governed by § 271(a), as it did to the supplying a component 
infringement claims at issue in WesternGeco II, which were governed 
by § 271(f)(2). . . . [A]s Power puts it, “Section 271(a) ‘vindicates do-
mestic interests’ no less than Section 271(f).”89    
The case thereafter settled pending appeal.90   
The district court in SIMO Holdings Inc. v. Hong Kong uCloudlink 
Network Technology Ltd.91 reached a similar conclusion. Plaintiff SIMO 
owns a U.S. patent on a system and method that enables a roaming device 
to access a local communications network by mimicking a local device.92 
 
 
83 Id. at 2139–40 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 2139. 
85 Id. at 2142. 
86 See infra notes 185–187 and accompanying text.   
87 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-01371, 2018 WL 
4804685, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2018). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 David Taylor, Settlement Leaves Important Question Unanswered—Power Integrations, Inc. v. 
Fairchild Semiconductor International, Inc., FEDCIRCUITBLOG (Nov. 8, 2019), https://fedcircuit-
blog.com/2019/11/08/settlement-leaves-important-question-unanswered-power-integrations-inc-
v-fairchild-semiconductor-international-inc/ [https://perma.cc/CCH9-83F2].  
91 SIMO Holdings Inc. v. H.K. uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd., 396 F. Supp. 3d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019), rev’d on other grounds, 983 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 
92 Id. at 332–33.  
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SIMO authorizes a wholly-owned subsidiary, Skyroam, to sell Wi-Fi 
hotspot devices that practice some of the claims of this patent.93 These 
devices function with unpatented data packages (“Daypasses”) that ena-
ble consumers to access their mobile data.94 SIMO filed an action against 
a competitor, uCloudlink, for allegedly selling infringing Wi-Fi hotspot 
devices in the United States.95 Following a trial on damages, the jury 
awarded a reasonable royalty based on testimony that, because neither 
company makes a profit on the sale of its Wi-Fi hotspot devices, but ra-
ther on the sales of Daypasses, a reasonable royalty would be “a function 
of the number of” noninfringing Daypasses that uCloudlink sold to users 
in the United States.96 The plaintiffs then filed a post-trial motion asking 
the court to supplement the damages award to reflect foreign sales of 
Daypasses that are used with devices purchased in the United States.97 
The court awarded the supplement, stating: 
WesternGeco controls this case. . . . [The Supreme Court] rea-
soned that permitting recovery for lost foreign profits was not an im-
permissible “extraterritorial” application of the statute, because the fo-
cus of § 284 is the infringement, which occurred domestically. 
The same is true here. uCloudlink committed an act of infringe-
ment by selling its devices in the United States. In the hypothetical 
world in which the parties had reached an ex ante licensing agreement, 
SIMO would be entitled to a licensing fee based on the number of 
Daypasses sold for use with that device, whether the Daypasses were 
used domestically or abroad.98 
The court further described WesternGeco as standing for the proposition 
that “patentees may recover for foreign injuries caused by domestic acts 
of infringement—as long as, of course, those injuries are proximately 
caused by the domestic acts.”99 In the present case, however, where the 
devices were “explicitly marketed and promoted as permitting easy ac-
cess to data while traveling internationally,” there was “no proximate 
cause concern.”100 To date, three other district court decisions101 are in 
 
 
93 Id. at 336. On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held that the district court’s claim construction 
was erroneous, and that the defendants were entitled to a judgment of noninfringement, thus negat-
ing the damages award. See SIMO Holdings Inc. v. H.K. uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd., 983 F.3d 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021). 
94 SIMO Holdings Inc., 396 F. Supp. 3d at 337–38. 
95 Id. at 332–33.  
96 Id. at 336–39. 
97 Id. at 350–51. 
98 Id. (citations omitted). 
99 Id. at 351. 
100 Id.        
101 See ABS Glob., Inc. v. Inguran, LLC, Nos. 3:14-cv-00503, 3:17-cv-00446, 2020 WL 2405380, 
at *8–9 (W.D. Wis. May 12, 2020) (denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law that, where 
the infringing products were made in the United States, the patent owner could not include the value 
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accord with the district courts’ reasoning in Power Integrations and 
SIMO, though two others102 have expressed doubt.  
II. ANALYSIS 
As the preceding Part shows, at present the bulk of authority appears 
to favor awarding U.S. patent owners compensation for losses incurred 
abroad—or, in the case of reasonable royalties, reflecting benefits gained 
by the infringer abroad103—as long as there is a sufficient nexus to an act 
of domestic infringement. This Part will argue that this rule is generally 
sound, subject to the traditional limiting doctrines of cause-in-fact, prox-
imate cause, and the single recovery rule. More specifically, Section II.A 
argues that, in general, awards based on foreign sales stemming from an 
initial act of domestic infringement should be considered cognizable 
harms under U.S. patent law. Sections II.B through II.D then show how 
proper use of the limiting doctrines will impose meaningful constraints 
against the undue expansion of U.S. patent rights. 
A. Cognizable Harm 
As noted in the Introduction, U.S. courts sometimes state that, as a 
general matter, the patent owner is entitled to full compensation for what-
ever loss it sustains as a result of the infringement.104 As a matter of 
 
 
of foreign sales in the royalty base; and declining to address the question of whether foreign man-
ufacture would have been a noninfringing alternative, because the defendant had waived this argu-
ment, and in any event had presented insufficient evidence to substantiate it); Plastronics Socket 
Partners, Ltd. v. Hwang, No. 2:18-cv-00014, 2019 WL 4392525, at *4–5 (E.D. Tex. June 11, 2019), 
report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2865079 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2019); Verinata Health, 
Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1106–07 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (agreeing that 
the focus of section 271(a) is domestic conduct, but concluding that (1) the U.S. patent owner had 
failed to prove that the profits lost on foreign sales were its own lost profits, as opposed to lost 
profits of related nonparty foreign companies, and (2) the defendant could not “show that the jury 
took into account any revenues from foreign subsidiaries in their damages, especially given that the 
jury only awarded $27 million of the requested $104 million”). The Federal Circuit affirmed Veri-
nata without addressing the extraterritorial damages issue. Verinata Health, Inc. v. Ariosa Diag-
nostics., Inc., 809 F. App’x. 965 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
102 See MLC Intell. Prop., LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-03657, 2019 WL 2437073, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2019) (stating that whether “WesternGeco II implicitly overruled Power 
Integrations I remains to be seen, but at this time controlling law holds that MLC may not seek 
damages under section 271(a) based on Micron’s wholly foreign sales”); Abbott Cardiovascular 
Sys., Inc. v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., No. 1:19-cv-00149, 2019 WL 2521305, at *18 (D. Del. 
June 6, 2019) (denying a preliminary injunction against the domestic manufacture of an allegedly 
infringing device for purposes of export, on the ground, inter alia, that WesternGeco does not 
“stand for the proposition that a patentee in the United States may obtain damages (or injunctive 
relief) based on harm in another country independent of the theory of infringement liability at issue–
i.e., § 271(a) versus § 271(f)”); Andrew C. Michaels, Implicit Overruling and Foreign Lost Profits, 
25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 408, 430 (2019) (concluding that, although the focus of section 271(a) 
is domestic conduct, to the extent Power Integrations “relied upon proximate causation, [it] was 
not implicitly overruled by WesternGeco”). 
103 See Cotter et al., Reasonable Royalties, supra note 70, at 16 (noting that a royalty typically 
reflects some portion of the incremental value to the defendant of using the patented technology 
over the next-best available noninfringing alternative).  
104 See supra note 3.   
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policy, the full compensation principle can be viewed as serving the goals 
of the patent system105 by ensuring that the patentee is no worse off, and 
the infringer no better off, than either would have been absent the in-
fringement.106 Put another way, the full compensation principle “pre-
serves the patent incentive by restoring the patentee to the position it 
would have occupied had the infringer either avoided infringement or ob-
tained a license.”107 
That said, the full compensation principle is not absolute.108 The law 
of patent damages, both in the United States and elsewhere, often must 
negotiate tradeoffs among several important considerations, including 
 
 
105 The most commonly articulated policy justifications for having a patent system are that patents 
provide an incentive (1) to invest in the creation of novel, useful, and nonobvious inventions; and 
(2) to disclose those inventions so that others may learn from them, improve upon them, design 
around them, license them, and once the relevant patents expire, freely practice them. Some of the 
relevant academic literature also proposes that patents confer social benefits by providing (3) an 
incentive to commercialize (innovate); (4) a means for patent owners to coordinate follow-up in-
vestment in improvements and to reduce the cost of patent races (the so-called “prospecting” func-
tion); and (5) a means for firms to “signal” private value to potential investors. At the same time, 
patents impose a variety of social costs, sometimes including monopoly and other access costs, 
transaction costs, and administrative costs. The ideal patent system therefore would maximize the 
surplus of social benefits over social costs, in comparison with alternatives such as public or private 
funding, grants, or prizes; tax credits; first-mover advantages; trade secrecy; and contract. For dis-
cussion, see THOMAS F. COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENTS IMPACT OUR DAILY LIVES 37–
54 (2018) [hereinafter COTTER, PATENT WARS].    
106 See Thomas F. Cotter, Make No Little Plans: Response to Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law 
of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 25, 27–28 (2014) (noting further that “[i]n 
practice, this means awarding the patentee the greater of its own lost profit, if any, resulting from 
the infringement or the royalty the parties would have negotiated ex ante had they believed the 
patent to be both valid and infringed”). 
107 Id. at 28. 
108 In addition to the countervailing considerations discussed in the text above, there are at least 
two counterarguments to consider against the goal of full compensation. The first is that, in princi-
ple, courts could aspire to correct for flaws in the substantive law by appropriately tailoring reme-
dies—for example, by awarding minimal damages for the infringement of a patent that is valid only 
because the law of nonobviousness is too weak to prevent the awarding of trivial patents. In other 
work, however, I have argued that legislatures and courts can more directly and effectively address 
perceived flaws in the substantive law by amending it, rather than doing so indirectly through the 
law of remedies. Moreover, for courts to use, for example, damages awards as a tool for correcting 
perceived flaws in substantive patent law might raise separation-of-powers and rule-of-law prob-
lems, at least in the absence of explicit legislative authority to do so. See THOMAS F. COTTER, 
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 49–51 (2013) [hereinaf-
ter COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES]; Cotter, supra note 106, at 30–33. Second, one 
might argue that the law of patent remedies should aim to directly serve the patent system’s ideal-
ized purpose of maximizing the surplus of social benefits over costs by, for example, awarding 
damages to compensate the patent owner for its research and development (R&D) costs, rather than 
to restore the owner to the position it would have occupied but for the infringement. See generally 
Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517 (2014). In 
response, I and others have argued that, as a general matter, it would not be advisable for courts 
hearing patent infringement lawsuits explicitly to tailor remedies in an effort to provide optimal 
incentives, for several reasons—among them, the lack of consensus on what the optimal reward 
would be, and the difficulty of obtaining adequate information on R&D costs, and of fairly appor-
tioning those R&D costs among multiple potential infringers, in any given case. See generally 
COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra, at 49–51; Cotter, supra note 106, at 30–31. All 
that said, there is a robust literature on the comparative efficacy of prizes, compulsory licenses, and 
other alternative mechanisms for inducing innovation, which I will not go into here. For discussion, 
see COTTER, PATENT WARS, supra note 105, at 47–51, 177, 192–93.   
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not only the goal of fully and accurately compensating patent owners, but 
also of deterring infringement and of applying rules that are cost-justified, 
predictable, and administrable.109 The perceived need to deter infringe-
ment sometimes may require courts to deploy supracompensatory reme-
dies such as enhanced damages, particularly if the type of infringement 
at issue otherwise is likely to go undetected or unremedied.110 Alterna-
tively, other policies may counsel in favor of providing compensation that 
falls below the patent owner’s actual loss. In the United States, for exam-
ple, prevailing patent owners are eligible to recover their attorney’s fees 
only in exceptional cases.111 This standard is generally consistent with the 
“American Rule,” under which each party bears its own litigation ex-
penses, and which is intended to reduce the probability that risk-averse 
parties will abandon meritorious claims, even at the expense of fully com-
pensating the prevailing party.112   
More generally, because causal chains extend out to infinity, all 
bodies of law necessarily impose limits on the extent to which a person 
who has breached a legal duty is responsible for the consequences (espe-
cially the more remote consequences) of her acts.113 Generally speaking, 
 
 
109 See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Damages Heuristics, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 
161, 179 (2018). 
110 See Colleen V. Chien, Jorge L. Contreras, Thomas F. Cotter, Brian J. Love, Christopher B. 
Seaman & Norman Siebrasse, Enhanced Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and Interest, in 
COMPLEX PRODUCTS, supra note 33, at 90, 99 (noting that these may include not only enhanced 
damages, but also or alternatively injunctive relief, disgorgement of the infringer’s profits, and fee 
awards).  
111 See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2018); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 
555 (2014).  
112 See Chien et al., supra note 110, at 106; see also Seaman et al., supra note 33, at 69–72 (dis-
cussing other arguably noncompensable harms). 
113 Among the doctrinal tools that courts may deploy to establish limits are cause-in-fact, see, e.g., 
Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 449–50, 452 (2014) (stating that “[t]he traditional way to 
prove that one event was a factual cause of another is to show that the latter would not have occurred 
‘but for’ the former,” but that “alternative and less demanding causal standards are necessary in 
certain circumstances to vindicate the law’s purposes”); proximate cause, see, e.g., Hemi Grp., LLC 
v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (stating that “[p]roximate cause . . . requires ‘some direct 
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,’” and that “[a] link that is 
‘too remote,’ ‘purely contingent,’ or ‘indirec[t]’ is insufficient”) (citations omitted) (third alteration 
in original); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that “[j]udi-
cial limitations on damages, either for certain classes of plaintiffs or for certain types of injuries 
have been imposed in terms of ‘proximate cause’ or ‘foreseeability’” and that “[s]uch labels have 
been judicial tools used to limit legal responsibility for the consequences of one’s conduct that are 
too remote to justify compensation”); duty, see, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 
546 (1994) (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)) (describing “duty” as 
“functionally equivalent” to proximate cause); “zone of interests,” see, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 129, 132–33 (2014) (based on the presumptions 
“that a statutory cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests ‘fall within the zone of 
interests protected by the law invoked’” and “that a statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs 
whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute,” limiting false advertising claims 
under Lanham Act § 43(a) to persons who can show that “the deception wrought by the defendant’s 
advertising” causes consumers “to withhold trade from the plaintiff”); antitrust injury, see Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (holding that a private antitrust 
plaintiff must be able to show that it is threatened with “antitrust injury, which is to say injury of 
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these doctrines are premised on the assumption that extending liability 
too far is unlikely to deter the type of wrongful act at issue, and may 
instead either over-deter actors from engaging in beneficial conduct or, 
alternatively, undermine the purposes the body of law is intended to carry 
out or other important public policies.114 Sections II.B through II.D below 
discuss three such limits in particular, namely, cause-in-fact, proximate 
cause, and the single recovery rule. The remainder of this Section, 
 
 
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defend-
ants’ acts unlawful”); and the “economic loss” rule, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR ECON. HARM § 7 (AM. L. INST. 2020) (stating that “[e]xcept as provided elsewhere in this 
Restatement, a claimant cannot recover for economic loss caused by: (a) unintentional injury to 
another person; or (b) unintentional injury to property in which the claimant has no proprietary 
interest”). Two other related doctrines of potential relevance here are “the fruit of the poisonous 
tree” doctrine, see, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 612 n.4 (2004) (plurality opinion) (de-
scribing “the doctrine known by the metaphor of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree,’ developed in the 
Fourth Amendment context . . . ,” as standing for the proposition that “evidence otherwise admis-
sible but discovered as a result of an earlier violation is excluded as tainted, lest the law encourage 
future violations”); and the single recovery rule (also known as the rule against double recovery). 
For a classic statement of the latter, see Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley, 170 P.2d 448, 452 (Cal. 
1946) (Traynor, J., dissenting) (stating that “[w]hen the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full 
for the injury done him, from whatever source it may come, he is so far affected in equity and good 
conscience, that the law will not permit him to recover again for the same damages,” and that “the 
rule against double recovery is aimed at preventing unjust enrichment”) (internal quotations omit-
ted); see also John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 CALIF. L. 
REV. 56, 77 n.100 (1983) (stating that the fact that Justice Traynor’s “statement stems from a dis-
senting opinion does not detract from its validity”). As Fleming notes, however, there are some 
standard exceptions, for example when the parties agree otherwise by contract, or when the com-
mon law imposes the collateral source rule and insurers are unable to obtain subrogation. Id. (pas-
sim). 
114 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM § 7 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 
2020) (explaining the economic loss doctrine as resting on concerns that awarding damages for 
remote economic losses caused by an unintentional injury to another’s property could result in 
liability “out of proportion to the culpability of the defendant” which are not “likely to be justified 
by comparable benefits,” because it is unlikely that “threats of open-ended liability would usefully 
improve the incentives of parties to take precautions against accidents or would make a material 
contribution to the cause of fairness”; moreover, “the victims of economic injury often can protect 
themselves effectively by means other than a tort suit”); Blair & Cotter, supra note 15, at 71 & 
nn.313–14 (arguing that, when the defendant’s conduct does not materially increase the ex ante 
probability of the injury occurring, “the social costs of imposing liability may exceed the social 
benefit of a reduction in injury, because the imposition of liability when the probability of injury is 
very low will have little if any ex ante deterrent effect, and may impose substantial administrative 
costs”) (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Economic 
Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 124–29 (1983), and Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation 
and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 481, 484, 490–93 (1980)); 
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and 
Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5, 18–21 (1995) (noting that, in theory, the antitrust 
injury requirement “screens the economic interests of the plaintiff” to ensure that it cannot “collect 
damages for losses that stem from competition,” a result that “would undermine the very purpose 
of those laws”); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use in Oracle: Proximate Cause at the Copyright/Patent 
Divide, 100 B.U. L. REV. 389, 396–98, 417–21 (2020) (arguing that proximate cause, duty, antitrust 
injury, and copyright’s fair use doctrine all serve to limit liability in circumstances in which impos-
ing liability would not advance the goals of the relevant body of law); see generally Amy L. 
Landers, Proximate Cause and Patent Law, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 329, 352–64 (2019) (citing 
various sources to argue that proximate cause reduces the risk of overdeterring reasonable or so-
cially beneficial conduct); Mark A. Lemley, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree in IP Law, 103 IOWA 
L. REV. 245, 249 (2017) (stating generally that “the law does not—and likely cannot—fully undo 
the harm caused by various infractions,” and that it instead “tries to balance the effort to redress 
injury with the practical limits of tracing the ripples of causation as far as they might go”).  
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however, will address the preliminary question of whether courts should 
consider extraterritorial losses (or gains, on the part of the infringer) that 
are factually and proximately caused by an act of domestic infringement 
as cognizable harms (gains) for purposes of patent law.115 This type of 
question is perhaps more analogous to the antitrust injury doctrine, under 
which a private antitrust plaintiff must be able to articulate how the de-
fendant’s conduct threatens the plaintiff with “antitrust injury, which is 
to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and 
that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”116   
In a recent paper, for example, the author of this Article argued that 
U.S. patent law rightly excludes damages for emotional harm, because 
awarding such damages would undermine the utilitarian purposes for 
which patent laws exist.117 In the present context, by contrast, where an 
initial act of domestic infringement causes the owner to lose both domes-
tic and foreign profits, there is no difference in kind between these two, 
purely commercial, losses. Writing shortly before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in WesternGeco, Stephen Yelderman illustrated this point by 
posing a hypothetical in which a patent owner earns $2 million from using 
its patented tool in Texas and $1 million from using it in Louisiana; an 
infringer makes the tool in Texas and sells it to firms in Texas and Loui-
siana; and the purchasers use the tool in, respectively, Texas and Louisi-
ana, thereby driving the owner’s profit to zero:  
But if we change the facts slightly so that the patent holder is 
using her patented tool not in Texas and Louisiana but in Texas and 
France, her quest for full compensation will encounter the Federal 
Circuit’s geographic limit on patent damages. The $2 million loss of 
 
 
115 To be sure, cognizability and proximate cause inquiries are sometimes intertwined—particularly 
when courts invoke policy reasons as a basis for concluding that an injury was (or was not) proxi-
mately caused by the defendant’s wrongful act, which can be just another way of saying that the 
injury is (or is not) a cognizable consequence of that type of act. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. 
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 264, 274–75 (5th ed. 1984)) (stating that “proximate cause analysis turns on policy 
considerations and considerations of the ‘legal responsibility’ of actors”). In Section II.C, however, 
I will assume that extraterritorial losses are, in general, a cognizable type of harm for patent in-
fringement, and consider whether there are, nonetheless, some standard situations in which it might 
be appropriate to conclude that those losses are too remote, unforeseeable, or indirect to qualify for 
relief. 
116 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. Other scholars have argued that the various bodies of IP laws ex-
pressly should (and to some extent, already implicitly do) apply an analogous “IP injury” require-
ment. For recent discussion, see, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: 
Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 985 (2010) (proposing that the IP owner be required 
to prove “demonstrable injury that is tied to the purpose for which the IP laws were passed”); Gor-
don, supra note 114, at 397–98, 417–21; Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 
100 B.U. L. REV. 71, 119–29 (2019) (proposing, as “one specific implementation of the IP injury 
idea,” that courts should ask whether the plaintiff would have “suffer[ed] the same injury from a 
market intervention that is not infringing”).  
117 See Thomas F. Cotter, Damages for Noneconomic Harm in Intellectual Property Law, 72 
HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2021). 
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profits in Texas would remain cognizable, but the court would deny 
recovery of the $1 million loss of profits in France. . . .  
This change in outcome is remarkable, because nothing about 
the infringing conduct has changed—the other manufacturer is still in-
fringing under § 271(a), at the same volume, still in Texas, through 
the manufacture and sale of the patented tool. Moreover, the harm 
those domestic acts of infringement have done to the patentee is the 
same too—she is still $3 million worse off as a direct result of the 
infringement. But, because the patent holder’s business is now vulner-
able in a different market—she is losing profits in Texas and France, 
not Texas and Louisiana—the Federal Circuit would stop short of re-
storing her rightful position.118 
Further, as Yelderman noted in the amicus brief he filed in WesternGeco, 
there is nothing unusual about compensating victims of domestic torts for 
losses they have incurred or will incur outside the United States: if 
Smith’s U.S. factory sells products to both U.S. and foreign firms, and 
Jones’s negligence causes the factory to burn down, under general tort 
law, Jones will be liable for Smith’s quantifiable lost profits on the for-
gone domestic and foreign sales.119 In the simple tort case, Yelderman 
argues, it seems clear that “drawing a line at the water’s edge” would 
“subvert the fundamental goal” of placing the prevailing plaintiff “in the 
position he would have enjoyed absent the wrong.”120 Absent some basis 
for treating patent disputes differently from other types of tort cases—a 
result that would be contrary to contemporary trends121—the same prin-
ciples should apply here.122 
 
 
118 Yelderman, supra note 55, at 4. 
119 Brief of Law Professor Stephen Yelderman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, 
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011), 2018 WL 
1393832; see also Brief for United States on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for The Federal Circuit as Amicus Curiae at 13, WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geo-
physical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011) [hereinafter U.S. Brief] (noting that “a for-
eign tourist negligently injured in a car crash in the United States may recover full compensation 
from the tortfeasor, including for lost wages that the tourist would have earned in his home coun-
try,” and that “[t]he fact that the wages would have been earned abroad would not prevent the 
defendant’s domestic negligence from being treated as the proximate cause of their loss”).  
120 Brief of Law Professor Stephen Yelderman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 119, at 2. 
121 See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1416 
(2016) (stating that “the Supreme Court has consistently sought to eliminate patent exceptionalism, 
bringing patent law in conformity with what it characterizes as general legal standards”). 
122 As discussed above, full compensation arguably preserves the patent incentive scheme and dis-
courages infringement. See supra notes 3, 105 and accompanying text. Of course, it could be the 
case that the patent incentive scheme is itself out of whack, but if so, the better response would be 
to reform the substantive law or at least the law of patent damages generally. See supra note 108; 
see also Yelderman, supra note 55, at 4–5 (noting that “failing to restore the plaintiff’s rightful 
position does not necessarily mean that damages are undercompensatory as a matter of policy,” but 
that the problem with the Federal Circuit’s post-2000 case law was that it “replaced a set of gener-
ally applicable, flexible tools for limiting damages with a newly crafted, bright-line prohibition that 
applie[d] only to a particular scope boundary”). 
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Confusion nevertheless may arise because, contrary to the typical 
tort case, the foreign activity that causes the owner’s loss may also violate 
foreign patent law (which, moreover, might be different from U.S. law in 
important respects)123—or, alternatively, may be permitted under foreign 
law because, for example, the foreign country does not extend patent pro-
tection to the subject matter of the patent, or exempts the defendant’s 
conduct from the scope of liability.124 For this reason, several commen-
tators have argued that for U.S. courts to award damages for extraterrito-
rial harms resulting from an act of domestic infringement would intrude 
upon the sovereignty of other countries by regulating conduct within their 
borders.125    
This line of argument is misguided, however, because in cases such 
as WesternGeco, Power Integrations, and SIMO, the United States would 
not be regulating foreign conduct, but rather deciding what the conse-
quences should be for an act of domestic infringement.126 To be sure, to 
the extent those consequences can include compensation for the profits 
the U.S. patent owner would have earned abroad absent the domestic in-
fringement, the defendant may be discouraged from engaging in those 
 
 
123 For example, the remedies for infringement may be different. U.S. law permits enhanced dam-
ages for willful infringement, see Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016), 
whereas most other countries do not (often or ever). See Chien et al., supra note 110, at 94–96. On 
the other hand, U.S. law no longer awards the infringer’s profits for the infringement of utility 
patents, and usually does not award attorney’s fees, see supra notes 33, 111 and accompanying 
text, whereas other countries often do both. Id. at 104–06; Seaman et al., supra note 33, at 75–80.  
124 See, e.g., COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 108, at 13 n.30, 56 (noting 
that, unlike the United States, some countries do not award patents for higher life forms; but that 
some have a broader experimental use defense than does the United States).   
125 See Chao, supra note 55, at 86–87; Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality and Proximate 
Cause After WesternGeco, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 189, 205–06 (2019); Sapna Kumar, Patent Dam-
ages Without Borders, 25 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 73, 109–10 (2018); Landers, supra note 114, at 
339–40; see also 7 PATRY, supra note 44, § 25:92 (making the same argument with regard to cop-
yright).  
126 As Judge Rakoff reasoned in SIMO, for example: 
uCloudlink argues that SIMO cannot recover for Daypasses purchased abroad because 
foreign infringement is not infringement at all. But that argument “conflates legal injury 
with the damages arising from that injury.” SIMO does not seek to recover for “infringe-
ment” abroad. Rather, it seeks to recover fully for a domestic act of infringement, i.e. the 
sale of an Infringing Device in the United States. And SIMO is entitled to full compen-
sation for that act of infringement, even if some of the harm traceable to it occurred 
abroad. 
SIMO Holdings Inc. v. H.K. uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd., 396 F. Supp. 3d 323, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 
2019) (quoting WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2138 (2018)) (cita-
tions omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 983 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Judge Rakoff’s analysis, 
in my view, refutes commentators such as Holbrook, who writes that “[a]n award of damages based 
on foreign conduct is the same as finding a party liable based on extraterritorial acts.” Holbrook, 
supra note 125, at 206. By the same token—and contrary to the opinions of some commentators, 
see WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2143 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Chao, supra note 55, at 87—the 
United States would have no ground for complaining if a foreign court were to determine that the 
consequences of a foreign infringement include compensation for profits the patent owner other-
wise would have made in the United States. Indeed, that is precisely what happened in the Canadian 
AstraZeneca decision discussed supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.  
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loss-generating foreign activities. But such would be the case (indeed, 
even more so) if a court were to enjoin the defendant from engaging in 
the domestic manufacture of a product it intends to export for purposes 
of sales in another country; and yet, it seems reasonably clear that a court, 
subject to the exercise of its equitable discretion,127 has the authority to 
do that.128 This is not to suggest that courts necessarily should grant 
 
 
127 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 283, 
which states that courts: “may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity,” as 
requiring the plaintiff to “demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that reme-
dies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) 
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity 
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction”). 
Studies published in the years following eBay indicated that courts still were granting prevailing 
patent owners’ requests for permanent injunctions, in contested cases, about seventy-five percent 
of the time. See GENEVA CLARK, LEX MACHINA, PATENT LITIGATION REPORT 2019, at 24–25 
(discussed in Thomas F. Cotter, News on Injunctions, COMPAR. PAT. REMEDIES BLOG (Mar. 11, 
2019), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2019/03/news-on-injunctions.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HV5M-LPUF]); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation Af-
ter eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983 (2016).   
128 There do not appear to be any recent U.S. cases clearly stating that a court may enjoin the 
domestic manufacture of a product intended for export. There are some old ones, however. See 
Bullock Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 129 F. 105, 109 (6th Cir. 1904); 
Adriance, Platt & Co. v. McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co., 55 F. 288, 292 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1893) 
(granting a preliminary injunction against the domestic manufacture of a patented machine for ex-
port), aff’d, 56 F. 918 (7th Cir. 1893) (per curiam). The issue also has been squarely addressed in 
some recent non-U.S. decisions. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Gupta, (2018) 5675 IA 1, 7, 
10 (2019) (India), http://164.100.69.66/jupload/dhc/PRJ/judgement/19-11-2019/PRJ18112019SC 
8232018.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PHW-G7SQ] (granting an interim injunction against the domestic 
manufacture for export of an anti-diabetes drug, and specifically rejecting the argument that doing 
so amounts to the extraterritorial application of Indian patent law); Alliedsignal Inc. v. DuPont Can. 
Inc., [1998] CanLII 7464 para. 5 (Can. Ont., F.C.), https://canlii.ca/t/4cf8 [https://perma.cc/RAX8-
J6MJ] (noting that the Federal Court of Appeal had previously enjoined the defendant’s manufac-
ture of infringing products for sale outside Canada); Sandeep K. Rathod, Interim Injunctions and 
Working of Patents: A Short Note from India, 16 J. GENERIC MEDS. 72 (2020) (discussing other 
Indian cases addressing this issue and arguing that in cases unlike Merck in which the patent owner 
is not domestically working the patent, the equities may favor denying the injunction). Moreover, 
the TRIPS Agreement imposes strict limits on the ability of countries to grant compulsory licenses 
for domestic firms to manufacture drugs for export to developing countries—which limits would 
be unnecessary if the general consensus was that, as a matter of international patent law, countries 
could decide that domestic manufacture for export is not remediable at all. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31bis, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (as 
amended Jan. 23, 2017) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; COTTER, PATENT WARS, supra note 105, 
at 199–200 (discussing the lead-up to this provision).  
Further, by way of analogy, there seems to be little doubt that a copyright owner can obtain 
an injunction against the unauthorized copying of a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) work, 
even though the effect of such an injunction might be to impede the defendant from using the work 
to construct a useful article—which construction itself, however, is not an act of infringement. 17 
U.S.C. § 113(b) (2018) (stating that the Copyright Act “does not afford, to the owner of copyright 
in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the mak-
ing, distribution, or display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works 
under the law . . . in effect on December 31, 1977”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 105 (1976) (stating 
that “copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work portraying a useful article as such, does 
not extend to the manufacture of the useful article itself”) (citation omitted). See, e.g., Oravec v. 
Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] could not 
establish infringement of these works because, unlike an architectural work copyright, a PGS cop-
yright does not protect against the construction of a building based on copyrighted architectural 
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injunctions in such cases, if ongoing royalties would be an adequate rem-
edy—in which case, however, we are back to the initial question of hav-
ing to decide whether the royalty should reflect some portion of the value 
of the expected foreign sales. The point nevertheless remains that, if it 
does not unduly intrude upon foreign sovereignty for a domestic court to 
enjoin domestic manufacture—even when the practical effect of doing so 
is to deter the defendant from engaging in lawful conduct abroad—it is 
hard to see how awarding damages that may have a similar deterrent im-
pact constitutes any greater intrusion.129  
Of course, even if awarding damages reflecting extraterritorial 
harms or benefits does not unduly interfere with other countries’ laws, 
such a practice might be undesirable simply as a matter of U.S. patent law 
or policy. In this regard, Professor Holbrook argues that, even after West-
ernGeco, courts should not award extraterritorial damages for violations 
of section 271(a), because the focus of that provision is distinct from that 
of section 271(f): 
For section 271(f)(2), the focus, as noted by the Court, is on domestic 
conduct—supplying components of the patented invention from 
within the United States. But part of that focus is supplying from the 
United States to outside of the United States. The contemplated result 
of infringement under section 271(f)(2) is regulation of events outside 
of the United States. The statute even contemplates the potential as-
sembly of the invention outside of the United States in a way quite 
 
 
plans; it only prohibits copying of the plans themselves.”); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 
658, 664, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing that copyright in a PGS work (architectural plans) did 
not entitle the plaintiff to an injunction against construction of a building, but preliminarily enjoin-
ing further copying of the plans themselves, and impounding existing copies).  
Finally, if it is fair to assume that, after WesternGeco, the extraterritorial lost profit resulting 
from the export of components of a patented device in violation of section 271(f) constitutes cog-
nizable harm to the patent owner, the avoidance of which might in some cases justify injunctive 
relief, it would seem odd if courts lacked the authority to enjoin the manufacture for export of the 
entire device. I therefore conclude that the district court decision in Abbott Cardiovascular Sys., 
Inc. v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 1:19-cv-00149, 2019 WL 2521305, at *18 (D. Del. June 6, 
2019)—holding that the loss of foreign sales resulting from domestic manufacture of a patented 
invention cannot qualify as a cognizable irreparable harm for purposes of deciding whether to grant 
a preliminary injunction—was incorrect.  
129 The above is subject to the qualification that the domestic manufacture was the cause-in-fact of 
the foreign conduct, in the sense that the defendant could not have achieved the same result by 
manufacturing the product outside the United States. See infra Section II.B. Note also that Patent 
Act § 283 states that courts may enter injunctions only “to prevent the violation of any right secured 
by patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2018). Because the extraterritorial manufacture, use, or sale of an 
article patented in the United States does not infringe “any right secured by a [U.S.] patent,” U.S. 
courts generally lack the authority to enjoin the foreign conduct itself. See Spine Sols., Inc. v. Med-
tronic Sofamor Danek USA, Inc., 620 F.3d 1305, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting, however, that 
courts may enjoin a defendant who has exported infringing products from repatriating them back 
to the United States). In addition, because the Patent Act does not grant patent owners a right against 
exportation, the court lacks authority to enjoin the defendant from exporting a product it lawfully 
made in the United States before the patent issued. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 
F.3d 1342, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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distinct from § 271(a). This express consideration of foreign activity 
is in sharp contrast to the explicit territorial limits of section 271(a). 
Section 271(a) does not contemplate any activity outside of the United 
States, other than the importation of the invention into the United 
States, the impact of which would be domestic.130   
Holbrook’s analysis is clever, but it strains against the actual language of 
WesternGeco, which repeatedly characterizes the conduct regulated by 
section 271(f)(2) as “domestic” in nature, full stop,131 and emphasizes the 
need to consider the focus of both section 284 and the relevant substan-
tive provision. On this latter issue in particular, the Court stated:   
The portion of § 284 at issue here states that “the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement.” We 
conclude that “the infringement” is the focus of this statute. As this 
Court has explained, the “overriding purpose” of § 284 is to “affor[d] 
patent owners complete compensation” for infringements. . . . 
. . . . 
In sum, the focus of § 284, in a case involving infringement un-
der § 271(f)(2), is on the act of exporting components from the United 
States. In other words, the domestic infringement is “the objec[t] of 
the statute’s solicitude” in this context. The conduct in this case that is 
relevant to that focus clearly occurred in the United States, as it was 
ION’s domestic act of supplying the components that infringed West-
ernGeco’s patents. Thus, the lost-profits damages that were awarded 
to WesternGeco were a domestic application of § 284.132 
Imagine now that the case had involved section 271(a) instead of 
section 271(f)(2). The only necessary alteration to the portion quoted 
 
 
130 See Holbrook, supra note 125, at 220–21 (footnotes omitted); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Is 
There a New Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property?, COLUM. J.L. & ARTS (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 46–47), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3757627 [https:// 
perma.cc/H9L7-XVQ9]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent In-
fringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745, 1777–83, 1790 (2017) [hereinafter Holbrook, 
Boundaries]. 
131 Specifically, the court stated: 
Section 271(f)(2) focuses on domestic conduct. It provides that a company “shall be 
liable as an infringer” if it “supplies” certain components of a patented invention “in or 
from the United States” with the intent that they “will be combined outside of the United 
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within 
the United States.” The conduct that § 271(f)(2) regulates—i.e., its focus—is the domes-
tic act of “suppl[ying] in or from the United States.” As this Court has acknowledged, 
§ 271(f) vindicates domestic interests: It “was a direct response to a gap in our patent 
law,” and “reach[es] components that are manufactured in the United States but assem-
bled overseas.” As the Federal Circuit explained, § 271(f)(2) protects against “domestic 
entities who export components . . . from the United States.” 
WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2137–38 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
132 Id. (citations omitted) (brackets in original). 
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above would be to amend the second paragraph to read something like 
this (altered portion in italics): 
In sum, the focus of § 284, in a case involving infringement under 
§ 271(a), is on the act of making, using, offering to sell, selling, or 
importing the patented invention in the United States. In other words, 
the domestic infringement is “the objec[t] of the statute’s solicitude” 
in this context. The conduct in this case that is relevant to that focus 
clearly occurred in the United States, as it was ION’s domestic act of 
making [or using, offering to sell, selling, or importing] an invention 
that infringed WesternGeco’s patents. Thus, the lost-profits damages 
that were awarded to WesternGeco were a domestic application of 
§ 284.  
Holbrook’s interpretation does not explain why one should expect 
that the Court would have engaged in some more extensive revision—
leading to a different result—had the case involved section 271(a). In-
deed, as ION’s attempt to distinguish the pre-2000 case law demonstrates, 
if anything the case for awarding extraterritorial damages seems stronger 
in the section 271(a) context, since there necessarily would have been an 
initial manufacture or sale of the complete product within the United 
States.133   
Finally, however, one might argue that awarding damages for extra-
territorial losses in some sense enables U.S. patent owners to leverage 
their domestic rights to control conduct falling outside the scope of those 
rights. Here an analogy might be drawn to various doctrines in patent and 
(copyright) law that prevent IP owners from leveraging their rights to en-
compass unprotectable subject matter. Patent law, for example, limits pa-
tent owners’ ability to assert control over subject matter that they have 
already commercially exploited,134 or that is on a trajectory toward public 
 
 
133 See Brief for Respondent at 29 n.10, WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129 (No. 16-1011), 2018 WL 
1517869 (arguing that, “[i]n calculating a reasonable royalty . . . a factfinder may consider the ex-
pected foreign use of an object in determining the reasonable royalty rate that would have emerged 
from the hypothetical negotiation, even though the factfinder cannot properly use a physical article 
manufactured, sold, and used abroad in the royalty base”); id. at 42 (distinguishing some of the pre-
2000 cases on the ground that “the defendant manufactured or sold an infringing product in the 
United States”). ION also distinguished some of the pre-2000 case law, as well as cases decided 
under copyright’s predicate act doctrine, on the ground that they involved the disgorgement of the 
defendant’s profits, rather than the plaintiff’s lost profits. See id. at 42–46. As noted above, how-
ever, there is no compelling economic rationale for such a distinction. See supra note 45 and ac-
companying text. 
134 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) (2018) (precluding an inventor from obtaining a patent if she 
publicly discloses the invention more than one year prior to filing a patent application); Helsinn 
Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (holding that a patent applicant 
is barred from obtaining a patent if she places the subject matter on sale more than one year prior 
to filing a patent application); Sun Pharm. Indus. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 611 F.3d 1381, 1384–85 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (holding that an inventor is precluded from patenting obvious variations over her own 
previously patented invention). 
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disclosure,135 or that is already in some sense in the public domain.136 It 
also includes the (somewhat amorphous) misuse doctrine, which con-
strains owners from exercising power beyond the patent’s intended 
scope.137 Within the domain of copyright, the fair use, idea–expression, 
merger, and misuse doctrines respond to analogous concerns.138 So per-
haps one could argue that, since U.S. patent rights are territorial, award-
ing damages based on extraterritorial harms unduly expands their scope, 
even if those harms are tethered to an initial act of domestic infringe-
ment—or, as William Patry puts it in another context, awarding such 
damages would be “to grant a remedy when there is no right.”139      
There are several reasons why this argument does not work, how-
ever. First, as discussed above, awarding extraterritorial damages does 
not really expand the geographic scope of U.S. patent rights but rather 
only sets the appropriate compensation for domestic infringement.140 
Second, and also as discussed above, a patent (or copyright) owner can 
obtain an injunction against domestic manufacture (copying), subject to 
the court’s equitable discretion, even if, as a practical matter, the effect is 
to prevent the defendant from doing something in another country.141   
Third, there are other contexts in which courts have permitted patent 
owners to recover damages for harms to unprotected subject matter, 
where those harms were caused by an initial act of infringement. The 
principal example arises when the patent owner sells two products, one 
incorporating its patented technology and one not, and the defendant sells 
 
 
135 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2018) (precluding an inventor from obtaining a patent if, prior 
to her filing date, the claimed invention is described in a pending application that later issues). A 
slightly different version of this provision was codified at 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) prior to the 2011 
America Invents Act, while another provision, section 102(g), precluded an inventor from obtaining 
a patent if prior to her date of invention the claimed invention had been made in the United States 
by another inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(e), (g) (2006), 
repealed by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 286 
(2011). 
136 Examples include the inherency doctrine, see, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 371 (2005); some applications of patentable subject matter doctrine, see Kevin Emerson 
Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 391, 396 
(2012) (arguing that “[i]f it is simply the mental comprehension of a newly discovered law of nature 
that distinguishes a claimed process from the prior art . . . the process is not patentable subject mat-
ter”); and rules precluding a person who obtained the subject matter from another from obtaining a 
patent on it, see Dennis Crouch, With 102(f) Eliminated, Is Inventorship Now Codified in 35 U.S.C. 
101? Maybe, but Not Restrictions on Patenting Obvious Variants of Derived Information, 
PATENTLY-O (Oct. 4, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/10/with-102f-eliminated-is-inven-
torship-now-codified-in-35-usc-101.html [https://perma.cc/5NJ2-2Q9N]. 
137 For discussion, see, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse 
Doctrine, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 457 (2011); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 
901 (2007). 
138 For discussion, see, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property 
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 503–15 (2006); Gordon, supra note 114. 
139 2 PATRY, supra note 44, § 3:105. 
140 See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying text. 
141 See supra notes 127–129 and accompanying text. 
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infringing products that compete against both of the owner’s products. 
According to the Federal Circuit’s decision in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley 
Co., in such a case the owner may recover its lost profits on lost sales of 
both the patented and unpatented products, in accordance with the full 
compensation principle.142 In addition, if the owner typically sells some 
unpatented, complementary product (e.g., spare or replacement parts) 
along with its patented product, and the infringement deprives the owner 
of sales of both the patented product and the unpatented complements, 
the owner may recover lost profits on lost sales of the complementary 
products, though only if the complementary goods “function together” 
with the patented subject matter.143 In a similar vein, courts will award 
“head-start” or “springboard” damages to compensate for the defendant’s 
ability to enter the market sooner, after the patent has expired, than it 
would have done had it avoided infringing during the patent term.144 As 
Yelderman has argued, however, if courts permit recovery for losses out-
side the technical or temporal scope of the patent, where those losses are 
caused by an act of infringement, it is not obvious why the result should 
be different when the loss is outside the patent’s geographic scope.145 
 
 
142 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546–49 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). The majority 
therefore rejected the dissenting judges’ view, see id. at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting), that allowing 
the owner to recover lost profits on lost sales of the unpatented goods effectively expands the scope 
of the patent to unpatented subject matter.   
143 Id. at 1549–51. In other work, Roger Blair and I have argued that, in general, Rite-Hite was 
correctly decided. We were somewhat less sure that the Federal Circuit was right to require proof 
that the complementary products function together with the patented products but suggested some 
possible justifications. Blair & Cotter, supra note 15, at 88–91. We also argued, more tentatively, 
that the owner probably should be entitled to recover her lost profits on lost sales of unpatented 
goods that compete against the infringing goods, even when (unlike in the Rite-Hite case itself) she 
does not sell any goods incorporating her patented technology. Id. at 74–84. See also COTTER, 
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 108, at 116–18, 187, 318 (discussing Rite-Hite, and 
parallels under English and Japanese law); THOMAS F. COTTER, REMEDIES IN U.S. PATENT LAW 
39 n.2 (2d ed. 2020) (responding to criticism of Rite-Hite); Seaman et al., supra note 33, at 64–66. 
144 See Lemley, supra note 114, at 255 n.38 (collecting district court cases awarding such damages 
and noting that “these cases extend damages to cover products that were ‘in process’ but not actu-
ally made at the time the patent expired”). Injunctive relief would be unavailable, however, under 
the express language of section 283. See id. at 255. In addition, as Lemley further points out, the 
law of contributory infringement expressly confers rights against unpatented components that have 
no substantial noninfringing use, see id.; and, for better or worse, injunctions directed against prod-
ucts that contain protected and unprotected subject matter, reach-through royalties, and damages 
awarded in accordance with the so-called “entire market value rule” also may allow the owner to 
capture the value of some unprotected subject matter. See id. at 256–59, 261. Another example 
would be some applications of Patent Act § 271(g), see infra text accompanying note 228. 
145 See Yelderman, supra note 55. Note that, in some cases in which defendants have used PGS 
works to construct useful articles, courts have awarded damages or profits based on the defendant’s 
exploitation of those useful articles, even though, as noted above, the copyright in the PGS work 
does not preclude the manufacture of the useful article itself. See supra note 128 (discussing 17 
U.S.C. § 113(b)); see, e.g., Tire Eng’g & Distrib., LLC v. Shandong Linglong Rubber Co., 682 
F.3d 292, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Robert R. Jones Assocs., Inc. v. Nino Homes, 858 
F.2d 274, 280–81 (6th Cir. 1988). Some commentators have argued, however, that these cases un-
dermine section 113(b). See 2 PATRY, supra note 44, § 3:105; Lemley, supra note 114, at 261 n.75. 
These cases might seem consistent with the logic expressed in the text above, though arguably 
awarding any damages for the exploitation of a type of thing that a body of law does not protect is 
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Of course, one might argue that these cases permitting recovery for 
harms to unprotected subject matter were themselves wrongly decided—
or that some broader principle that explains them nevertheless counsels 
against awarding extraterritorial damages. In this regard, Mark Lemley 
argues that three factors should be relevant in determining whether an IP 
owner should be allowed to control or benefit from “the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree”—that is, the defendant’s “unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s 
work in the course of producing something else that does not itself in-
fringe the IP right.”146 The first is the extent to which the defendant has 
added value to the plaintiff’s initial contribution, because “the more val-
uable the defendant’s contribution is, the more reluctant we should be to 
ban it or require the defendant to disgorge its profits from that non-in-
fringing work.”147 Second, courts should consider “whether the defendant 
was a willful infringer,” because “[o]ne reason to deprive a defendant of 
downstream benefits traceable to infringement is to deter the act of in-
fringement,” but “deterrence only works against people who make a de-
liberate decision to infringe.”148 Third, courts might consider the diffi-
culty the IP owner would face in trying to enforce its “IP rights against 
direct acts of infringement,” though Lemley admits that he is “somewhat 
nervous about th[is] third justification because . . . it is easy to abuse.”149 
While not necessarily disagreeing with Rite-Hite or with cases 
awarding head-start damages,150 Lemley apparently views his three pro-
posed factors as weighing against awards of extraterritorial damages,151 
although he does not flesh out specifically how they would apply in this 
context. The first factor, however, actually seems to weigh in favor of 
permitting extraterritorial damages, at least in garden-variety cases in 
which the defendant is selling the same type of product as the plaintiff. 
 
 
different in kind from awarding extraterritorial damages for the exploitation of a type of thing the 
body of law does protect. As discussed above, in other common settings it is not unusual to award 
damages to compensate for extraterritorial losses caused by a domestic wrong. See supra text ac-
companying notes 119–122.  
146 See Lemley, supra note 114, at 250; see also id. at 264–65. 
147 Id. at 264.  
148 Id.; see also Landers, supra note 114, at 399 (arguing, in her discussion of proximate cause, that 
“[t]he patent system should consider treating non-willful infringers that create implementations 
which generate social goods, including public goods, in light of its goals”). Patent infringement is, 
in general, a strict liability tort, see Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(citation omitted), but in the present context the argument would be that the defendant’s state of 
mind is relevant in determining whether patent law should enable the owner to benefit from an-
other’s production of unprotected subject matter derived from a predicate use of protected subject 
matter. 
149 Lemley, supra note 114, at 264–65.  
150 See id. at 255, 258–59. 
151 See id. at 254 & n.37 (expressing agreement with the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Carnegie 
Mellon, WesternGeco, and Power Integrations, as well as with Professors Chao and Holbrook); see 
also id. at 260–61 & n.75 (arguing that Copyright Act § 113(b) rightly prevents “the depiction of a 
work” from being “parlayed into control over the work itself”).  
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More generally, as long as the defendant’s domestic manufacture, use, or 
sale does not escape infringement liability, it is hard to see how the over-
seas sale of the very same product would add sufficient value to the plain-
tiff’s initial contribution to merit a different outcome. Additionally, while 
it is true that you can only deter a knowing infringer, a rule that excludes 
patent owners from recovering extraterritorial damages would risk en-
couraging defendants to engage in domestic infringement, knowing that 
the full consequences of their activities would be irremediable. In a case 
like WesternGeco or SIMO, for example, if the damages awarded for do-
mestic misconduct cannot reflect the defendant’s plans for subsequent 
exploitation of the infringing subject matter overseas, those damages may 
be much less than what the parties themselves would have agreed to in 
voluntary licensing negotiations, absent the infringement.152 Similarly, 
without the risk of incurring liability for extraterritorial lost profits, there 
is much less reason to avoid engaging in domestic manufacture for ex-
port.153 For these same reasons, the plaintiff might not be able to derive 
much value from challenging the initial infringement.   
To be sure, if the plaintiff has parallel patent protection in the im-
porting country, it could seek to recover damages for the defendant’s ex-
ploitation of the patented subject matter there (though this option might 
not be available in cases like WesternGeco, where the patented combina-
tion was assembled and used on the high seas).154 Even so, it is difficult 
to see exactly why patent owners should be put to this expense, if as ar-
gued above, awards of extraterritorial damages do not undermine comity, 
and if the end result—ensuring that the patent owner receives (more or 
less) full compensation—is a desirable one.155   
 
 
152 For that matter, it is not clear what a coherent damages methodology would even be in such 
cases. See infra note 163. 
153 The risk of being enjoined of course would provide some disincentive, though if the patentee’s 
losses from foreign sales are not cognizable harms, it is not clear what the basis would be for en-
tering an injunction either. See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text. 
154 See Kumar, supra note 125, at 104–09 (arguing that it is uncertain, under “the law of the flag” 
doctrine, whether the law of the country whose flag the ship flies would apply in a case like West-
ernGeco).  
155 By way of contrast, in copyright cases it may be easier to (1) assert claims abroad, since copy-
rights (unlike patents) require no examination, see, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971, and as amended Sept. 
28, 1979, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that, in countries of the Berne Union other than 
the country of origin of the work, “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of [copyright] rights shall not 
be subject to any formality”); and (2) convince a U.S. court to adjudicate foreign copyright, as 
opposed to patent, claims, see Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of 
Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 43–46 
(1999) (arguing that U.S. courts should be more open to adjudicating foreign copyright claims and 
applying foreign law to remedies); cf. Kumar, supra note 125, at 110 (arguing that it makes sense 
for courts to apply the predicate act doctrine more liberally in copyright as opposed to patent cases). 
For fuller exploration of this topic, see Cotter, supra note 10. 
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B. Cause-in-Fact and Noninfringing Alternatives 
Assuming that the extraterritorial losses described above constitute 
cognizable harms under U.S. law, then, consistent with generally appli-
cable tort principles, the patent owner must be prepared to prove, as 
needed, that any such loss for which it seeks compensation was both 
caused-in-fact and proximately caused by an act of domestic infringe-
ment.156 Limiting our focus for now to cause-in-fact, this means that an 
owner seeking to recover actual damages must prove that, but for the in-
fringement, it would have earned x additional dollars.157 Put another way, 
losses that would have occurred anyway, even absent the infringement, 
are not compensable.   
One long-recognized implication of this principle is that, if the de-
fendant could have avoided infringing by employing a noninfringing al-
ternative, the infringement has not caused the plaintiff to suffer any actual 
harm because whatever losses it did suffer would have occurred any-
way.158 To illustrate by means of the hypothetical from the Introduction, 
 
 
156 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545–46 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
157 See id. A reasonable royalty often is thought of in a similar manner, as restoring the royalty the 
parties would have negotiated had the defendant not infringed. See Cotter et al., Reasonable Roy-
alties, supra note 70, at 8–10.    
158 See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1351–53 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(stating that “[w]ithout the infringing product, a rational would-be infringer is likely to offer an 
acceptable noninfringing alternative, if available, to compete with the patent owner rather than 
leave the market altogether,” and that evidence of the availability of such an alternative can enable 
the defendant to “avoid[ ] lost profits”); see also Blair & Cotter, supra note 15, at 73 (stating that 
“the availability of a noninfringing alternative . . . means that the infringer has not ‘caused’ any 
harm at all, since the patent owner would have suffered the same loss absent the infringement”); 
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 116, at 77, 127–28 (proposing that “[i]f the plaintiff would suffer 
the same injury from a noninfringing market intervention, that injury cannot be evidence of IP 
infringement,” and citing the noninfringing alternatives concept as illustrating this principle); Ste-
phen Yelderman, Damages for Privileged Harm, 106 VA. L. REV. 1569, 1582, 1602 (2020) (argu-
ing that in some contexts, including patent law, courts reduce damages awards to reflect the amount 
by which the defendant lawfully could have caused the plaintiff to suffer harm).  
Note also that, although U.S. courts (unlike their foreign counterparts) no longer award the 
infringer’s profits in utility patent cases, see supra note 33, recognition of the noninfringing alter-
natives principle appears to have originated in that context. See, e.g., Black v. Thorne, 111 U.S. 
122, 124 (1884). Logically, the same considerations would apply as in the lost profits context: if in 
the absence of the infringement the infringer would have exited the market in which the patented 
article competes, all of the profit the infringer earned is rightly attributable to the patented technol-
ogy. On the other hand, if the infringer could have competed using a noninfringing alternative, the 
profit (or cost saving) properly attributable to the use of the patented technology is only the addi-
tional profit (or cost saving) that the infringer earned above what it would have earned by using the 
noninfringing alternative. To award the entire profit under such circumstances renders the infringer 
worse off than it would have been absent the infringement, and (as in the lost profits example) 
overvalues the patented technology. For discussion of other countries’ approaches to the relevance 
of noninfringing alternatives, see Seaman et al., supra note 33, at 60–61 (noting that France and 
Canada follow a similar approach to the United States in regard to lost profits, and critiquing the 
English courts’ long-standing view that noninfringing alternatives are irrelevant).  
Finally, note that there may be cases in which the noninfringing alternative would have been 
equally acceptable to some but not all of the infringer’s customers. From an economic perspective, 
the appropriate award in such a case would be either (1) the lost profit on the additional sales the 
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suppose that Starchild alleges that Big Bang’s infringing sales of solar 
cells to U.S. customers caused Starchild to lose one hundred sales (and 
thus the profit it would have earned on those sales) to those same custom-
ers. If there were no noninfringing alternatives that Big Bang could have 
used that would have been equally acceptable to those customers, then 
absent the infringement, Big Bang would not have competed with 
Starchild for those sales, and Starchild has indeed lost the hundred sales 
(assuming it had sufficient capacity to make those sales itself).159 If, how-
ever, Big Bang would have made the same hundred sales by resorting to 
a noninfringing alternative technology, Starchild would have lost those 
hundred sales anyway, and thus has not lost any profit as a result of the 
infringement (though it may be entitled to a reasonable royalty reflecting 
the cost the infringer saved, if any, by using the patented invention instead 
of the alternative).160 To award a lost profit on the hundred sales therefore 
would render Starchild better off than it would have been, but for the in-
fringement. It also would overvalue the patented technology’s contribu-
tion to the art, because the economic value of a technology is its value 
over the next-best available noninfringing alternative.161 In such in-
stances, the only relief to which Starchild is entitled is a royalty reflecting 
the value (if any) to Big Bang from preferring the infringing to the non-
infringing alternative (for example, its lower cost).162 
A similar analysis would be necessary to evaluate whether Big 
Bang’s U.S. infringement caused Starchild to lose the hundred Canadian 
sales. As above, if Big Bang could have made an equally satisfactory so-
lar cell by using a noninfringing technology, then Starchild has not lost 
any sales to the (in this case) Canadian customers, though it would still 
be entitled to a royalty for the unauthorized domestic manufacture. As-
suming further, however, that the royalty should reflect the bargain the 
parties themselves would have negotiated ex ante, this bargain presuma-
bly would have reflected some portion of Big Bang’s expected profits 
 
 
patentee would have made but for the infringement, coupled with a reasonable royalty on the in-
fringing sales that did not deprive the patentee of sales or (2) the infringer’s entire profit earned on 
sales that deprived the patentee of sales, plus (for the remaining infringing sales) the profit above 
what the infringer would have made by using the noninfringing alternative. See COTTER, 
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 108, at 116.   
159 See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (to 
recover lost profits, plaintiff must prove, inter alia, “manufacturing and marketing capability to 
exploit the demand”). 
160 See Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1352–53. The district court had earlier awarded a three-
percent royalty, based on a portion of the cost saving the defendant enjoyed from using the patented 
process over the noninfringing alternative. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 
F. Supp. 1386, 1392–93 (N.D. Ind. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
161 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 15, at 19. 
162 See Grain Processing, 893 F. Supp. at 1392–93. 
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from sales in Canada,163 or, more likely, a running royalty on its actual 
sales there.164 This is, essentially, Judge Rakoff’s rationale for awarding 
SIMO a royalty based on uCloudlink’s domestic and extraterritorial sales 
of Daypasses, which is what he concluded the parties themselves would 
have agreed to had they negotiated a license for uCloudlink’s domestic 
sales of devices incorporating SIMO’s patented technology.165 
Crucially, however, even if there is no noninfringing technological 
alternative to Starchild’s invention, it is still possible that Starchild suf-
fered no actual loss as a result of Big Bang’s Canadian sales, if Big Bang 
could have avoided infringing the U.S. patent by making the infringing 
product outside the United States (say, in Canada itself). Any such out-
sourced manufacture would be lawful as far as U.S. law is concerned—
and therefore, if feasible, should be viewed as a noninfringing alternative 
that would have lawfully caused Starchild to lose the Canadian sales.166 
Thus, if the evidence shows that the defendant could have outsourced 
production to avoid domestic infringement, the defendant should be lia-
ble only for a reasonable royalty reflecting some portion of the benefit 
(e.g., lower labor costs) of domestic versus foreign production.167 
 
 
163 See supra note 70 (discussing the hypothetical negotiation framework). Indeed, if the rule were 
otherwise—if courts had to award royalties for the unauthorized domestic manufacture of the pa-
tented technology without taking account of the defendant’s plans for its subsequent exploitation—
it is not at all clear what that royalty would be. The value to the defendant of manufacturing the 
invention and then not doing anything with it would be zero.   
164 See Norman V. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, A New Framework for Determining Reasonable 
Royalties in Patent Litigation, 68 FLA. L. REV. 929, 988 (2016) (noting that running royalties, the 
product of a royalty rate times a base consisting of the revenue derived from sales of the infringing 
product, are usually thought to be more common than lump-sum royalties). 
165 SIMO Holdings Inc. v. H.K. uCloudlink Network Tech. Ltd., 396 F. Supp. 3d 323, 350–51 
(S.D.N.Y. 2019), rev’d on other grounds, 983 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also U.S. Brief, 
supra note 119, at 23 n.3 (noting that “the amount of the appropriate royalty may be significantly 
reduced” if the calculation “must ignore the infringer’s potential to earn profits outside the United 
States”).  
166 See Yelderman, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that manufacturing and selling the product abroad 
would avoid infringing the U.S. patent); U.S. Brief, supra note 119, at 9 n.1 (stating that the “right 
to recover lost profits may be further limited by consideration of how an infringer might have ad-
justed its own conduct to mitigate its liability—including . . . by shifting all of its operations 
abroad”). Of course, if Starchild has a corresponding Canadian patent, Big Bang’s manufacture and 
sales in Canada might infringe under Canadian law, but arguably that should be of no relevance to 
the U.S. action. See infra Section III.B. Anticipating the outsourcing argument, Professor Chao 
argues that awarding extraterritorial damages is a bad idea precisely because U.S. patent law should 
not encourage companies to outsource, see Chao, supra note 55, at 88–89, but the argument elides 
the fact that the unauthorized domestic manufacture of the patented technology is itself unlawful.  
167 In theory, there is a third possibility as well: that the next-best available noninfringing alternative 
to making the infringing product in the United States would have been employing the alternative 
technology and doing so outside the United States. In that case, again, the royalty would reflect 
some portion of the value to the defendant of having avoided this option. Note also two less obvious 
matters that could complicate the determination of whether Starchild actually lost the Canadian 
sales. First, although the majority of U.S. cases allocate to the patent owner the burden of coming 
forward with evidence that there were no adequate noninfringing alternatives, there is some case 
law (including Grain Processing itself) that appears to allocate the burden to the defendant. See 
Seaman et al., supra note 33, at 62–63 (noting, in addition, that “there is little discussion in the 
legal or economic literature addressing which of these approaches is optimal”). Second, there may 
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Whether the defendants in Power Integrations, Carnegie Mellon, and 
WesternGeco could have made such an argument, as a factual matter, is 
a question to which I cannot speak; but if the analysis is correct, the con-
cern that awarding extraterritorial damages risks opening the floodgates 
to catastrophic liability would seem to be exaggerated. Part III below will 
elaborate, by means of some examples.168 
Before moving on, however, it is important to note that there is one 
possible remaining objection which could throw a monkey wrench into 
everything argued above: namely, that once courts are free to regard ex-
traterritorial losses caused by domestic infringement as a type of cogniza-
ble harm, judges (and juries) will resist applying the outsourcing-as-non-
infringing alternative principle, and that as a result damages awards 
systematically will be overcompensatory.169 Juries in particular may find 
it distasteful to hear how the defendant could have avoided causing harm 
to the plaintiff by moving operations overseas—or consider it nothing 
more than a lawyer’s trick to try to make damages go away. Anticipating 
this in advance, defense lawyers may be reluctant even to bring the matter 
up at trial; and as long as there are contestable issues of fact regarding the 
feasibility of outsourcing, the matter is unlikely to be resolved on a mo-
tion for summary judgment. Of course, to the extent judges are less likely 
than juries to take offense at the argument, it may not be as much of an 
issue in bench trials (which, however, are a minority of patent infringe-
ment trials in the United States)170 or in other countries (where there are 
no juries in patent cases).171 On the other hand, some other countries (in-
cluding the United Kingdom) do not apply the noninfringing alternatives 
principle at all when awarding lost profits for patent infringement,172 
which poses a risk that if these countries were to recognize extraterritorial 
 
 
be instances in which the evidence shows that the defendant could have avoided infringing by out-
sourcing production, but would not have done so for business or ethical reasons. In such a case, 
arguably it makes sense not to consider outsourcing as a feasible noninfringing alternative. For 
discussion, see Norman Siebrasse, The “Would Have” Branch of the Non-Infringing Alternative 
Analysis, SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION BLOG (Apr. 17, 2020), http://www.sufficientdescription 
.com/2020/04/the-would-have-branch-of-non-infringing_75.html [https://perma.cc/Z2A3-VNTL]; 
see also Yelderman, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that “intellectual property rights, customer rela-
tionships, and domestic manufacturing advantages may prevent complete expatriation from being 
a realistic alternative for the accused infringer”). 
168 As Part III will show, the questions of whether the defendant could have manufactured the prod-
uct abroad, as well as whether the plaintiff itself could have exploited the product abroad, become 
yet more complicated when there are foreign patents that may read on the relevant products. See 
infra Sections III.B–D.  
169 I thank Bernard Chao and Mark Lemley for raising different versions of this point with me. 
170 See COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 108, at 59 n.40. 
171 See id. at 59. In Canada, for example, where there are no juries in patent cases, the Federal Court 
of Appeal has held that outsourcing can be a noninfringing alternative to infringing domestic man-
ufacture. Apotex Inc. v. ADIR, [2017] F.C.A. 23, paras. 30, 33 (Can. Ont.), http://decisions.fca-
caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/218443/index.do [https://perma.cc/S22D-77VM]. 
172 See discussion supra note 158. 
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losses as cognizable harms they might exacerbate an already-existing risk 
of overcompensation. Moreover, under U.S. law, the prevailing patent 
owner is entitled to “damages adequate to compensate for the infringe-
ment, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty”;173 and while it is 
possible that a U.S. court would be willing to award only a minimal roy-
alty (perhaps even zero)174 in a case in which the defendant easily could 
have outsourced (and thus gained no substantial economic advantage 
from domestic production), one might question whether as a matter of 
fact courts would be willing to follow this argument all the way to its 
logical conclusion. 
In the end, it is not altogether clear how to address these objections, 
other than to state that it would be preferable for courts to apply the non-
infringing alternatives principle accurately and consistently, rather than 
to impose artificial limits on damages as a second-best solution; and to 
note that, at least in the United States (and Canada, for that matter), courts 
have experience applying the noninfringing alternatives principle gener-
ally, despite the logic of the argument perhaps being difficult for nonspe-
cialists to grasp. Judges also have to apply many other “technical” rules, 
such as the rules of evidence, and hope that juries will follow appropriate 
limiting instructions. Still and all, if experience comes to show that judges 
and juries view the cognizability of extraterritorial losses as a warrant for 
awarding economically unsupportable damages, the second-best alterna-
tive of eliminating such awards would become more attractive. But I 
would counsel against making that concession just yet.        
C. Proximate Cause 
As noted above, courts sometimes apply the proximate cause doc-
trine to exclude recovery for injuries that are “‘unforeseeable,’ ‘indirect,’ 
‘remote,’ ‘speculative,’ or barred for ‘policy considerations.’”175 Like the 
other exclusionary doctrines discussed above, with which it sometimes 
overlaps, proximate cause precludes responsibility for injuries under cir-
cumstances in which imposing liability would be unlikely to deter wrong-
ful conduct, would risk overdeterring beneficial conduct, or would under-
mine the purpose of the body of law at issue or other public policies.176 
Since Section II.A has already addressed many of the arguments against 
extraterritorial damages that commentators sometimes raise under the 
 
 
173 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018). 
174 See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that “a fact 
finder may award no damages . . . when the record supports a zero royalty award,” such as when 
“the defendant considered the patent valueless and the patentee would have accepted no payment 
for the defendant’s infringement,” but suggesting that this state of affairs may be “unlikely”). 
175 Blair & Cotter, supra note 15, at 71. 
176 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
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rubric of proximate cause,177 this Section will concentrate on only a sub-
set of issues. More specifically, if we assume that a given extraterritorial 
harm (or benefit) is cognizable, and, further, that it is caused in fact by 
the defendant’s domestic infringement, are there nevertheless any cir-
cumstances under which courts should cut off liability because the harm 
or benefit is too remote, indirect, or speculative?   
In this regard, Professor Yelderman has argued that the Federal Cir-
cuit should have resolved both Carnegie Mellon and Power Integrations 
on proximate cause, rather than extraterritoriality, grounds—the former 
because the connection between the infringing U.S. sales cycle and the 
defendant’s subsequent sales to foreign customers was too tenuous, the 
latter because “customer preference for purchasing infringing and non-
infringing products as a package was too remote a connection to obtain 
lost profits on the non-infringing products.”178 On the other hand, he ar-
gues, the defendant should be liable for extraterritorial lost profits in a 
case like WesternGeco, where the defendant sold the components know-
ing and intending that its customers would combine them outside the 
United States, in order to compete against the patent owner.179    
Although Yelderman’s analysis of WesternGeco seems correct,180 
his analysis of the other two cases is questionable. The whole point of the 
infringing sales cycle in Carnegie Mellon, after all, was to attract foreign 
customers.181 Moreover, while Yelderman is correct to refer to the chips 
 
 
177 See, e.g., Landers, supra note 114, at 394–99 (arguing that proximate cause should preclude 
awards of extraterritorial damages because such awards would interfere with other countries’ poli-
cies, undermine U.S. patent policy, or would discourage beneficial infringement).  
178 Yelderman, supra note 55, at 10. As support for the statement that customer preference is “too 
remote a connection,” Yelderman cites Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Grp., Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), which in turn cites Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 
1995). 
179 See Yelderman, supra note 55, at 11.  
180 In particular, under general tort law principles, the fact that the lost profits were directly caused 
by third parties—the customers who bought the components, combined them, and used the combi-
nation to market services in competition with WesternGeco—should not be a bar to liability, where 
the third party’s conduct was both foreseeable and intended. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 34 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2010) (rejecting any cate-
gorical exception from liability against a tortfeasor whose initial breach is followed by a third 
party’s criminal or intentional act). Compare Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor 
Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (stating that “entirely extraterritorial produc-
tion, use, or sale of an invention patented in the United States is an independent, intervening act 
that, under almost all circumstances, cuts off the chain of causation initiated by an act of domestic 
infringement”), with Landers, supra note 114, at 375 (stating that “[p]roximate cause doctrine relies 
on the mechanism of the intervening, superseding cause to cut off liability in particular cases”). In 
addition, courts are less likely to invoke proximate cause as a reason for cutting off liability if the 
defendant’s breach was intentional, in contrast to cases in which the defendant is negligent or liable 
only as a matter of strict liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 33 (AM. L. INST. 2010). 
181 See Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., 807 F.3d 1283, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
Moreover, under general tort law principles, it usually does not matter if the specific amount of the 
resulting harm is unknown at the time of the breach, as long as the type of harm was foreseeable. 
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 31 
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sold to foreign customers in Power Integrations as noninfringing, they 
were the very same chips the defendant sold to domestic customers.182 As 
noted above, however, the Rite-Hite decision permits the recovery of 
damages for unpatented components which, together with the patented 
product, are “considered to be components of a single assembly or parts 
of a complete machine, or . . . together constitute[] a functional unit.”183 
But if proximate cause does not preclude a patent owner from recovering 
lost profits on sales of products that are only functionally related to the 
patented product, it is not clear why it would preclude her from recover-
ing lost profits on sales of products that are identical to the patented prod-
uct.184   
That said, proximate cause should work to limit liability in cases in 
which the initial act of domestic infringement is not so closely tied to 
subsequent foreign sales—as in the hypothetical Justice Gorsuch posed 
in his dissent in WesternGeco, in which the only domestic infringement 
appears to be the development of a prototype of an invention that the de-
fendant later makes and sells abroad.185 In such a case, it is hardly obvious 
that, under standard proximate cause analysis, the initial act of manufac-
turing the infringing prototype in the United States would necessarily be 
the legal cause of all of the infringer’s foreign sales. One might imagine 
that often there would be several intervening steps between the develop-
ment of the prototype and at least some of the subsequent acts of making 
and selling abroad; but as the Court has noted elsewhere in regard to prox-
imate cause, “[t]he general tendency . . . in regard to damages at least, is 
 
 
(AM. L. INST. 2010). Cf. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546 (stating that “remote consequences, such 
as a heart attack of the inventor or loss in value of shares of common stock of a patentee corporation 
caused indirectly by infringement are not compensable”).   
182 See supra note 55.  
183 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1550. 
184 Yelderman’s other examples of proximate cause precluding damages seem more plausible. See 
Yelderman, supra note 55, at 9–10 (presenting a hypothetical in which “a patentee tried to claim 
that the defendant’s domestic infringement had impacted the global supply of components, and thus 
had reduced the profitability of the patentee’s sales in foreign markets,” and another in which it 
argued that domestic infringement caused it to lose “foreign sales on the theory that the infringe-
ment had distracted management, deprived the firm of capital, or otherwise increased its operating 
costs”). 
185 Specifically, the hypothetical was: 
Suppose a company develops a prototype microchip in a U.S. lab with the intention of 
manufacturing and selling the chip in a foreign country as part of a new smartphone. 
Suppose too that the chip infringes a U.S. patent and that the patent owner sells its own 
phone with its own chip overseas. Under the terms of the Patent Act, the developer com-
mits an act of infringement by creating the prototype here, but the additional chips it 
makes and sells outside the United States do not qualify as infringement. Under West-
ernGeco’s approach, however, the patent owner could recover any profits it lost to that 
foreign competition—or even three times as much, see § 284—effectively giving the 
patent owner a monopoly over foreign markets through its U.S. patent. 
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2142 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissent-
ing). 
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not to go beyond the first step.”186 And, of course, if the defendant could 
have developed the prototype abroad, the issue should not arise at all, 
because in that case any claim for lost profits should fail for lack of but-
for causation.187 Nevertheless, where it is the case that the defendant 
could not have made the prototype elsewhere, and the foreign sales are 
directly related to this initial infringement, the analysis above leads to the 
conclusion that the patent owner should recover damages for those for-
eign sales.     
D. The Single Recovery Rule 
One final issue to consider is whether, as some commentators have 
argued,188 awards of extraterritorial damages pose a risk that U.S. patent 
owners will be compensated twice, once in the United States and once in 
another country, for the same loss. Returning, once again, to the opening 
hypothetical, suppose that Starchild has patents covering the identical 
subject matter in the United States and Canada, and that Big Bang makes 
infringing products in the United States for sale in both countries. 
Starchild files suit, and prevails, in both countries as well. Suppose fur-
ther, however, that the Canadian court rules first, and awards Starchild 
the profit it lost on sales in Canada. If the U.S. court does not reduce the 
amount of the damages award by the amount already awarded in Canada 
for the Canadian sales, but rather also awards lost profits on those sales, 
Starchild will be compensated twice for the very same loss. Such a result 
would overvalue Starchild’s contribution to the state of the art, would 
seem grossly unfair to Big Bang, and would pose a risk of overdeterring 
others from selling products that pose only a small risk of infringing an-
other’s patent.189  
The risk of courts actually awarding such duplicative damages nev-
ertheless appears small. In a wide range of contexts, courts in the United 
 
 
186 Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 2 (2010) (quoting Holmes v. Secs. Inv’r Prot. 
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271–72 (1992)) (brackets in original). For further elaboration, see infra Sec-
tion III.F.  
187 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
188 See Landers, supra note 114, at 336; Holbrook, Boundaries, supra note 130, at 1789–90. 
189 The risk of overdeterrence arises because patent rights are uncertain. Even assuming that the 
defendant is aware of, or could readily become aware of, the patent at issue prior to launching its 
product, it may reasonably, but incorrectly, conclude either that the patent is invalid, or that it has 
successfully avoided infringing by designing around. As my coauthors and I have noted in other 
work, “[e]mpirical evidence indicates that over forty percent of patents litigated to judgment are 
invalidated in whole or in part, and that patentees overall win only about twenty-five percent of all 
cases litigated to judgment. . . . Invalidation and win rates in other countries are roughly compara-
ble.” Thomas F. Cotter, Erik Hovenkamp & Norman Siebrasse, Demystifying Patent Holdup, 76 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1549–50 n.151 (2019) (citations omitted). In addition, in some sectors 
it can be difficult to uncover relevant patents in advance of patent launch; patent claim terms can 
be opaque; and the cost of defending against a patent suit is notoriously high, which further fuels 
overdeterrence concerns. See COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 108, at 216, 
222.  
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States190 and other common law countries, such as Canada191 and the 
United Kingdom,192 have long applied something known variously as the 
“single recovery rule” or the “rule against double recovery.” In the patent 
context in particular, U.S. courts will award only one recovery for harm 
that is simultaneously caused by the violation of two or more intellectual 
property rights,193 or that is caused by two or more actors.194 It seems 
likely, then, that if a foreign court were to award damages for the foreign 
sale of the patented invention under that country’s own law, a U.S. court 
would reduce the damages for those same sales by an equivalent 
amount.195 As discussed above, that is exactly what a Canadian court, 
applying the rule against double recovery, did in a similar case in which 
it was the U.S. litigation that concluded first.196 And while the author of 
this Article cannot speak authoritatively about how other countries would 
approach this issue, the rule against double recovery is a standard norm 
in international arbitration197 and civil law countries appear generally to 
follow a similar principle derived from Roman law.198  
 
 
190 See, e.g., Tex. Advanced Optoelecs. Sols., Inc. v. Renesas, Elecs. Am., Inc., 895 F.3d 1304, 
1328 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[D]ouble recovery for the same injury is inappropriate.”) (citations omitted) 
(brackets in original); Janusz v. City of Chicago, 832 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that 
“under both federal and Illinois law . . . ‘[a] tort victim can obtain only one recovery for his harm, 
no matter how many tortfeasors inflicted it’”) (citations omitted) (brackets in original); Jerry R. 
Selinger & Jessica W. Young, Suing an Infringing Competitor’s Customers: Or, Life Under the 
Single Recovery Rule, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 29 (1997) (“[A] patentee is entitled to full 
compensation for related acts of infringement, but the patentee, like any tort victim, is not entitled 
to multiple recoveries for the same injury.”).   
191 See, e.g., AstraZeneca Can. Inc. v. Apotex Inc. [2017] F.C. 726, para 253 (Can. Ont.), https://de-
cisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fc-cf/decisions/en/235832/1/document.do [https://perma.cc/JVC2-G42P] (ap-
plying the principle against double recovery to reduce the patent owner’s recovery by the amount 
it already had received in the U.S. litigation for the same acts); Norman Siebrasse, Territoriality 
and Remedies for Transnational Infringement, SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION BLOG (Oct. 27, 2017), 
http://www.sufficientdescription.com/2017/10/territoriality-and-remedies-for.html#more 
[https://perma.cc/9ULS-DWCR] (citing Canadian antitrust cases articulating the same principle).  
192 See, e.g., Hunt v. Severs [1994] 2 AC 350 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.); Ramzan v. Brookwide 
Ltd. [2011] EWCA (Civ) 985, [2012] 1 All ER 903 (Eng.). 
193 See Tex. Advanced Optoelecs. Sols., 895 F.3d at 1328; Mareesa A. Frederick, Clara N. Jiménez 
& Alexander Poonai, Avoid Overlap in Trade Secret and Misappropriation Claims, LAW360 (Oct. 
10, 2018, 3:19 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1091023 (last visited Jan. 6, 2021) (discuss-
ing other cases).  
194 See Selinger & Young, supra note 190, at 29.   
195 There could be some residual left over if U.S. damages law applied to the facts of the case is 
more generous than Canadian law, or if the U.S. patent expires later. Or the Canadian award could 
be higher than the U.S. award, if Canadian law is more generous, or if the U.S. patent expires first 
(as was the case in AstraZeneca Can., [2017] F.C. 726, discussed supra notes 46–49 and accompa-
nying text).  
196 See AstraZeneca Can., [2017] F.C. 726, para. 253.   
197 See Craig Miles & David Weiss, Overview of Principles Reducing Damages, in GLOBAL 
ARBITRATION REVIEW: THE GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 81, 88–89 
(John A. Trenor ed., 2d ed. 2017) (stating that “[t]he principle against double recovery—or allow-
ing a party to obtain compensation in excess of what is required to make that party whole—is 
widely recogni[z]ed” in commercial arbitration, and “usually arises in the context of parallel, or 
multiple, related proceedings”).   
198 See, e.g., Case C-338/14, Quenon K. SPRL v. Beobank SA., ECLI:EU:C:2015:795, ¶¶ 34, 35 
(Dec. 3, 2015) (stating that E.U. law precludes member states from awarding double recovery to 
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In any event, as long as courts follow the first two limiting principles 
proposed above, relating to cause-in-fact and proximate cause, the num-
ber of cases in which duplicative damages would even be at issue should 
be relatively small. As Craig Miles and David Weiss observe in their dis-
cussion of the rule against double recovery in international arbitration, 
parties “should not be allowed to rely on the mere risk of double recovery 
as a defen[s]e to paying the first recovery.”199      
III. HYPOTHETICALS 
Building on the analysis presented in Part II, this Part returns to the 
Starchild v. Big Bang hypothetical with which the Article began and pre-
sents several variations on that initial fact pattern. As it will show, these 
variations largely fall into predictable patterns, which lend themselves to 
principled distinctions in treatment—though the outcome of at least one 
of them may remain unclear until certain preliminary questions of sub-
stantive patent law are resolved. 
 
 
terminated commercial agent); Council Directive 2004/35/CE, art. 16(2), 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56, 64 
(EC) (stating that Member States may adopt “appropriate measures, such as the prohibition of dou-
ble recovery of costs, in relation to situations where double recovery could occur as a result of 
concurrent action by a competent authority under this Directive and by a person whose property is 
affected by environmental damage”); Reinhard Zimmermann, Art 9:502: General Measure of 
Damages, in COMMENTARIES ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAWS 1461–62 (Nils Jansen & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2018) (discussing the principle of compensatio lucri cum damno in contract 
law); James Devenney & Geraint Howells, Chinese Law of Performance and Breach: A Common 
Law Perspective, in CHINESE CONTRACT LAW: CIVIL AND COMMON LAW PERSPECTIVES 351, 359 
(Larry A. DiMatteo & Lei Chen eds., 2017) (discussing rules against double recovery in Chinese 
contract law); Vera Korzun, Shareholder Claims for Reflective Loss: How International Investment 
Law Changes Corporate Law and Governance, 40 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 189, 193–94 (2018) (noting 
that corporate law in the United States, the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France, and Germany 
forbids claims for “reflective loss”—shareholder claims for injuries to a corporation, inter alia, to 
avoid double recovery, although international investment law treaties often expressly permit such 
claims); Ulrich Magnus, “Vorteilsausgleichung”–A Typical German Institute of the Law of Dam-
ages?, in VOORDEELTOEREKENING NAAR DUITS EN NEDERLANDS RECHT 1 (Ulrich Magnus & 
Chris van Dijk eds., 2015) (discussing the principle of Vorteilsausgleichung which, like compen-
sation lucri cum damno, generally requires courts to adjust the plaintiff’s monetary recovery to 
account for offsetting benefits); Eri Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in 
Japan, 26 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 396 (2009) (stating that courts reduce tort victims’ re-
coveries in Japan by the amount of their non-life insurance, to avoid double compensation). Note, 
however, that in the only other case I am aware of addressing the issue of duplicative recovery in 
the context of extraterritorial damages for domestic patent infringement, a Japanese court rejected 
the argument that the rule against double recovery prohibited the patentee from recovering damages 
based on sales in Europe, even though the plaintiff also had initiated litigation in Europe against 
the defendant’s affiliates for infringing the European counterpart to the Japanese patent. [Osaka 
Dist. Ct.] Jan. 28, 2010, no. 2007 (Wa) 2076, https://www.ip.courts.go.jp/app/files/hanrei_en 
/584/000584.pdf [https://perma.cc/AYA5-AUD6] (Japan). The court does not expressly address 
what the result would have been had the patentee sought and recovered damages against the Japa-
nese defendant itself in Europe. See also Marketa Trimble, The Territorial Discrepancy Between 
Intellectual Property Rights Infringement and Remedies, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 501, 542, 
549 (2019) (proposing an “individualized approach” to “overlapping remedies” cases but suggest-
ing that problems could arise if, for example, “the court in the target country would want to award 
the same profits as did the issuing court, but to a different IP rights owner”).      
199 Miles & Weiss, supra note 197, at 89 (emphasis added). 
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A. Example 1 
Suppose, as in the initial hypothetical, that (1) Starchild owns a U.S. 
patent on a product; (2) it makes patented products in the United States; 
(3) it sells some of them in the United States and some in Canada; and (4) 
there is no corresponding Canadian patent. Big Bang infringes the U.S. 
patent by making the patented product in the United States, in violation 
of section 271(a), and then sells some of these products in Canada. 
Starchild argues that Big Bang’s unlawful manufacture in the United 
States caused Starchild to lose 100 sales in Canada, from which it would 
have earned $1 million,200 because there was no reasonable technological 
alternative, acceptable to the relevant class of consumers, to its patented 
technology. Assuming that Starchild is correct about there being no rea-
sonable technological alternative, can Starchild recover the Canadian lost 
profits? 
Under the analysis presented in Part II, the answer is yes, but only 
if the evidence also shows that Big Bang could not have avoided infringe-
ment by making the products somewhere else and that Starchild’s as-
serted lost profits in Canada were proximately caused by the U.S. in-
fringement.201 If, on the other hand, Big Bang could have avoided 
infringement by outsourcing production, Starchild is entitled only to a 
reasonable royalty reflecting the value to Big Bang of not having had to 
employ that option.202 For example, suppose that Big Bang’s labor or 
other costs203 would be higher in Canada than in the United States, such 
that Big Bang would expect to earn $1 million from selling 100 solar cells 
in Canada if it produced them in the United States, but only $800,000 if 
it produced them in Canada. On these facts, the expected incremental 
benefit of producing 100 cells in the United States is $200,000, which is 
the most Big Bang would be willing to pay Starchild for a license to pro-
duce those 100 cells for export.   
Note that while U.S. law on the question of which party has the bur-
den of coming forward with evidence on noninfringing alternatives is 
somewhat muddled,204 it probably would make sense to allocate the bur-
den of production on feasibility and cost of outsourcing to the defendant, 
who is likely to have better access to this information than is the plaintiff. 
Moreover, courts should not simply take the defendant’s word for it that 
 
 
200 In this and all of the following examples, the reader should assume, for simplicity, that all dollar 
amounts are either rendered in, or correctly converted to, U.S. dollars. 
201 See supra notes 156–176 and accompanying text. 
202 See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
203 There could be a wide variety of different costs (and benefits) of producing in Canada, particu-
larly if the products are being sold in both countries. These may include transportation, tariffs, 
taxes, and so on.   
204 See supra note 167. 
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it could (and would) have profitably produced the product outside the 
United States, particularly in view of the fact that, perhaps for a variety 
of intangible reasons,205 in the real world the defendant did not do so.   
B. Example 2 
Assume the same facts as in Example 1, except that Starchild has a 
corresponding patent in Canada.    
In this case, it might initially seem that if (1) Starchild’s Canadian 
patent is valid and infringed, and (2) there is no reasonable technological 
alternative to the patented invention, then absent the infringing U.S. man-
ufacture Big Bang would have made no (lawful) sales in Canada; and that 
the U.S. court should award Starchild the profits it would have earned on 
the Canadian sales, but for the infringing manufacture in the United 
States. There are, however, some serious complicating factors.    
First, as noted above, U.S. courts generally do not adjudicate claims 
of foreign patent infringement, much less determine whether foreign pa-
tent claims are valid.206 It might therefore appear that a U.S. court could 
not make the initial determination that the Canadian patent is valid and 
infringed; and lacking that determination, it would have no basis for con-
cluding that Starchild could have excluded Big Bang from selling the so-
lar cells in Canada. To be sure, questions about adjudicating foreign pa-
tent rights typically arise when a patent owner files suit, in a domestic 
court, against someone it accuses of infringing its foreign patent; and the 
issue here would be less direct, in that Starchild would be asking a U.S. 
court only to consider what would happen in a hypothetical case in which 
it were to sue Big Bang for infringing the Canadian patent, so perhaps 
there would be some leeway.207 Still and all, absent a major shift in atti-
tude—and in view of the substantial costs (e.g., retaining and digesting 
conflicting expert testimony on foreign law) that the parties and the court 
would have to shoulder, if the court were to make this hypothetical deter-
mination—one might expect U.S. courts generally to resist calls for them 
do so. Assuming this is right, it leaves two options on the table.   
The first is that the U.S. court could simply presume, without decid-
ing, that Starchild’s counterpart Canadian patent is valid and infringed 
under Canadian law (subject, perhaps, to some preliminary showing that 
 
 
205 See supra note 167. 
206 See supra note 2.   
207 The American Law Institute’s Principles of Law Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and 
Judgments in Transnational Disputes, for example, recommends that “[a]n action to declare the 
invalidity of the rights registered in two or more States may be brought in the State or States in 
which the defendant is resident, but the judgment will be effective only to resolve the dispute be-
tween or among the parties to the action.” INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES 
§ 213(4) (AM. L. INST. 2008); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 2, at 792–93. 
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the claims are comparable to the claims of the U.S. patent)208 and award 
Starchild its lost profit on the Canadian sales, subject to the single recov-
ery rule as discussed below.209 The obvious problem with this option, 
however, is that it can result in overcompensation, if the Canadian patent 
later is found to be invalid or noninfringed.210 The reason is that, in such 
a case, Starchild would not have been able to exclude Big Bang from 
selling in Canada—and thus, as in Example 1, unless it would have been 
infeasible for Big Bang to outsource manufacture to Canada (or some 
other non-patent country), Starchild ultimately should recover only a rea-
sonable royalty reflecting some portion of Big Bang’s lower cost of U.S. 
manufacture, if any.  
The second, and arguably preferable, option would be for the court 
simply to ignore Starchild’s Canadian patent, which in effect brings us 
back within the fact pattern of Example 1 (no patent in Canada). As in 
Example 1, Starchild still could recover its lost profit on lost Canadian 
sales, though only if the evidence shows that Big Bang could have not 
have outsourced production to Canada or some other country; otherwise 
Starchild would be entitled only to a reasonable royalty reflecting the 
benefit, if any, to Big Bang of not having outsourced. This option seems 
superior to the first, in that Starchild can still file suit against Big Bang in 
Canada, if it wishes to do so, for the infringement of the Canadian patent. 
If the Canadian court then finds the Canadian patent to be valid and in-
fringed, it can award Starchild either its lost profit or (under Canadian 
law) Big Bang’s profit—minus, in accordance with the single recovery 
rule, whatever amount already has been awarded in the United States for 
those same Canadian sales. If, on the other hand, the Canadian court finds 
the Canadian patent invalid or not infringed, Starchild recovers nothing 
 
 
208 The claims of both patents might have originated in a common international application under 
the Patent Cooperation Treaty, for example. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 
7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Apr. 1, 2002). On the other hand, it could be that 
Starchild owns two different patents in the United States and Canada, each covering a different 
aspect of Starchild’s end product.  
209 This would be similar to what the Federal Circuit did in Rite-Hite, where the majority appears 
to have assumed that the defendant had no noninfringing alternative, because any competing prod-
uct it would have sold would have infringed either the patent in suit or some other patent Rite-Hite 
owned but was not asserting. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (Nies, J., dissenting in part) (noting that these other patents “were never asserted against 
Kelley, and the validity of those patents is untested”). For discussion, see Cotter, supra note 109, 
at 191–92 (noting that presuming these other patents were valid and infringed may seem dubious, 
though having to prove their validity and infringement might substantially increase the cost of ad-
judication); Seaman et al., supra note 33, at 62.  
210 See Siebrasse & Cotter, supra note 164, at 991–92 (discussing whether, in a case in which the 
defendant begins infringing before a patent that appears to cover an alternative technology is inval-
idated, the court should calculate the reasonable royalty on the fictional assumption that the bar-
gaining parties were aware that that patent was invalid). Of course, if the defendant were willing to 
concede the validity and infringement of the Canadian patent, the overcompensation problem 
would go away; but it is hard to imagine why the defendant would do that, if it is contesting the 
validity and infringement of a counterpart U.S. patent.     
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in Canada, but U.S. law still has vindicated a legitimate U.S. interest in 
compensating Starchild for the unauthorized domestic manufacture of its 
patented invention. 
To be sure, there is some risk that the second option could under-
mine U.S. policy in some cases—though that risk seems minimal (and, in 
any event, is outweighed by the countervailing risk of overcompensation 
noted above). To illustrate, suppose that (1) Starchild would have earned, 
and that Big Bang did earn, $1 million from the Canadian sales; (2) ig-
noring Starchild’s Canadian patent, Big Bang could have made the prod-
uct in Canada at only slightly higher cost, e.g., $100,000; and (3) the U.S. 
court concludes that a reasonable royalty for Big Bang’s domestic in-
fringement is half that amount ($50,000). Suppose further that the U.S. 
court concludes that Big Bang willfully infringed, and therefore awards 
treble damages amounting to $150,000. The Canadian court thereafter 
finds for Starchild and awards $1 million in lost profits, minus the 
$150,000 already awarded in the U.S. litigation. Starchild’s aggregate re-
covery is therefore $1 million. If the U.S. court had followed option one 
instead, however, it would have awarded $3 million ($1 million trebled). 
The Canadian court, in turn, likely would have awarded Starchild nothing 
for the Canadian infringement, since enhanced damages awards in Can-
ada are rare, and Canadian courts follow the single recovery rule. 
Starchild’s overall compensation therefore would have been $3 million 
had the U.S. court followed the first option, so perhaps one could argue 
that the second option to some degree undercuts U.S. policy (though no 
more so than if the U.S. court had awarded nothing at all for the infringing 
manufacture for export).211 And perhaps there could be other cases in 
which the damages rules of the two countries at issue are so vastly differ-
ent—maybe awards in the country of importation are, on average, grossly 
undercompensatory, for example—that, under option two, patent owners 
in the exporting country often would be left substantially worse off than 
they otherwise would have been under option one. But no system is per-
fect, and in view of the existing evidence on patentee win rates and patent 
invalidation rates around the world,212 the option that avoids predictably 
overcompensating domestic patent owners probably is to be preferred.     
A further caveat is that if a Canadian court already has awarded 
Starchild compensation for the Canadian sales, the U.S. court should de-
duct that compensation from whatever it otherwise would award for those 
sales (so long as the award does not fall below zero). To illustrate, sup-
pose that Starchild sues in both countries, but that the Canadian litigation 
 
 
211 See supra note 152 (noting the conceptual difficulty of calculating damages for an infringing 
manufacture only). 
212 See supra note 127. 
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ends first, with the court awarding Starchild its lost profit (equal to $1 
million U.S. dollars) on 100 sales that it would have made in Canada but 
for the infringement. In the U.S. litigation, the single recovery rule should 
preclude Starchild from recovering any lost profit on those same lost 
sales.213 Moreover, even if the Canadian and the U.S. courts award dif-
ferent amounts for the same sales, this should pose no problem as long as 
the second court makes an appropriate adjustment. For example, suppose 
that (1) the Canadian court goes first; (2) it awards Starchild Big Bang’s 
own profit on the Canadian sales, in accordance with Canadian law, in-
stead of Starchild’s lost profits; (3) because Big Bang is a more efficient 
producer of solar cells, Big Bang’s profit on the Canadian sales amounts 
to $2 million U.S. dollars; and (4) the U.S. court assesses lost profits or a 
reasonable royalty,214 in accordance with U.S. principles, in the amount 
of $1 million for the Canadian sales. In such a case, the U.S. court should 
reduce its own award for the Canadian sales to zero.215 Note, however, 
that the damages awarded for Starchild’s lost U.S. sales should remain 
unaffected, regardless of whether the Canadian court’s award for the Ca-
nadian sales is more or less than the amount the U.S. court would have 
awarded for the Canadian sales; the $2 million Canadian award is de-
ducted only from the latter, not from the overall U.S. award. Alterna-
tively, suppose that (1) the U.S. court goes first and awards Starchild $3 
million, that is, treble damages for Big Bang’s willful infringement; and 
(2) the Canadian court goes second and awards the equivalent of $1 mil-
lion U.S. dollars. Under these circumstances, the Canadian court should 
reduce its award to zero, to avoid a duplicative recovery. 
To sum up, courts should treat Example 2 cases the same as Exam-
ple 1 cases—subject only to the qualification that if litigation proceeds in 
both countries, the country that is the second to award relief for sales 
made in the importing country should subtract from that award the 
amount already awarded in the first country for those same sales.  
 
 
213 Starchild may still recover its lost profit on sales it would have made in the United States, but 
for infringement, as noted in the text above; and if the Canadian patent expires before its U.S. 
counterpart, it is possible that the U.S. award could include profits on additional sales Big Bang 
makes in Canada post-expiration (though only if it is not feasible for Big Bang to make the product 
in Canada, notwithstanding patent expiration there).   
214 If Big Bang really is a more efficient producer, economic logic suggests that Starchild would 
have licensed Big Bang rather than excluded it, but for the infringement. See Cotter, supra note 
109, at 173. 
215 Unless, that is, the U.S. court were to conclude that the U.S. infringement was willful, in which 
case it could award as much as $3 million minus the $2 million already awarded in Canada, for a 
net of $1 million. See supra note 123.  
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C. Example 3 
Now assume the same facts as in Example 2, except that it is Big 
Bang that owns the corresponding patent in Canada.216 On these facts—
and again assuming that U.S. courts would be reluctant to decide, even 
hypothetically, the scope and validity of the Canadian patent—there are 
again two options, neither of them ideal. 
First, the court could assume that the Canadian patent is valid and 
that it reads on Starchild’s solar cells. Under this scenario, Starchild could 
not have lawfully sold its products in Canada and would not be entitled 
to any lost profits on the sales Big Bang made in Canada. The U.S. court 
should instead award only a reasonable royalty reflecting some portion 
of the benefit, if any, to Big Bang of manufacturing its products in the 
United States instead of Canada (or somewhere else). This option may 
undercompensate Starchild, however, if in reality the Canadian patent is 
invalid or does not read on Starchild’s products; and, unlike the fact pat-
tern in Example 2, there will be no subsequent Canadian infringement 
suit to bring matters into balance, since Starchild does not have a patent 
in Canada.  
Alternatively, the court could ignore the Canadian patent, in which 
case the fact pattern is the same as in Example 1. The U.S. court would 
award either lost profits, if outsourcing was not feasible, or a reasonable 
royalty, if it was. Unfortunately, this option might overcompensate 
Starchild if Big Bang’s Canadian patent is valid and does read on 
Starchild’s product. 
Probably the better choice is the first option, since the second would, 
for purposes of the U.S. proceeding, effectively render Big Bang’s Cana-
dian patent a nullity. Moreover, Starchild would at least have the option 
of trying to defuse the issue in advance, by initiating an action in Canada 
to invalidate Big Bang’s Canadian patent.217 
 
 
216 It may be unlikely that each firm would have a patent claiming the identical subject matter, one 
in the U.S. and one in Canada, particularly now that the United States (like every other country in 
the world) follows a version of the first-inventor-to-file rule. See COTTER, PATENT WARS, supra 
note 105, at 17–19. Perhaps more likely is that Big Bang owns a Canadian, but not a U.S., patent 
that covers some feature of the product, and that Starchild owns a U.S., but not a Canadian, patent 
on some other feature. 
217 See COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 108, at 213–14. Most countries 
provide opportunities, through post-grant oppositions, invalidity proceedings, or declaratory judg-
ment actions, for persons to challenge the validity of issued patents, though the details vary con-
siderably from one jurisdiction to another. See id. (passim). Of course, if Starchild was actually 
selling products in Canada in competition with Big Bang, Big Bang could sue Starchild for in-
fringement in Canada (and Starchild might assert invalidity as a defense). In this instance, if the 
Canadian litigation terminates before the U.S. litigation, the U.S. court would know whether the 
Canadian patent was valid and infringed. It would then award Starchild a reasonable royalty only, 
if the Canadian patent was valid and infringed, and lost profits or a reasonable royalty otherwise. 
Alternatively, if the U.S. case ends first and the court applies option one, as recommended in the 
text above, a loss for Big Bang in Canada would mean that Starchild was undercompensated in the 
1. Cotter ARTICLE (Do Not Delete) 6/8/2021  10:25 AM 
2021] EXTRATERRITORIAL DAMAGES 51 
D. Example 4 
Assume the same facts as in Example 2, except that a third party T 
owns the corresponding patent in Canada. 
Although it seems unlikely that either party would have an incentive 
to call the court’s attention to T,218 should T’s existence come to light the 
court would face the same choices posed in Example 3. It could either 
ignore the patent and award Starchild damages in accordance with Exam-
ple 1, or assume that T’s patent is valid and infringed—but in this case, 
under the second option it would award no damages for the Canadian 
sales, not even a reasonable royalty, since the value to Big Bang of mak-
ing the product in the United States for unlawful sales in Canada should 
be presumed, as a matter of law, to be zero. As in Example 3, neither 
option seems very appealing, since the first risks overcompensating, and 
the latter undercompensating, Starchild, and Starchild cannot rectify the 
situation by suing Big Bang in Canada. Nonetheless, as in Example 3, the 
better choice probably is to assume the validity and infringement of T’s 
patent and award no damages. 
E. Example 5 
In all of the four preceding examples, Starchild claimed that, but for 
the domestic infringement, Starchild would have sold products embody-
ing the patented technology outside the United States, and that Big 
Bang’s domestic infringement caused it to lose the profit it would have 
earned on those foreign sales. In this example, by contrast, suppose that 
Starchild is willing to license the use of its patented technology but does 
not itself intend to make, use, or sell products embodying that technology. 
More specifically, suppose that Starchild owns a U.S. patent on a method 
of producing some unpatented product, X; without Starchild’s authoriza-
tion, Big Bang demonstrates the use of the method at a trade show in the 
United States attended by C, a Canadian citizen; and that, as a result, Big 
 
 
U.S. litigation; whether Starchild could successfully petition to reopen the U.S. judgment is a ques-
tion beyond the scope of this Article. A win for Big Bang in Canada would mean that the Canadian 
court would have to address the effect, if any, of Big Bang’s infringing manufacture in the United 
States on the amount of its Canadian lost profit award. If it could not have manufactured anywhere 
else, perhaps that award should be reduced to zero? But see Norman Siebrasse, Ex Turpi Causa Not 
Relevant to Patent Litigation, SUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION BLOG (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.suffi-
cientdescription.com/2014/11/ex-turpi-causa-not-relevant-to-patent.html [https://perma.cc/CS5N-
WU8C] (arguing that, in a case involving analogous facts, if the remedy granted the plaintiff in the 
exporting country does not fully offset the remedy extended to the other party in the importing 
country, “this simply reflects the territorial nature of patent law”).  
218 If T’s patent is valid and infringed, Big Bang is infringing in Canada, but Starchild could not 
lawfully sell its product there either absent a license from T. Alternatively, if T’s patent is neither 
valid nor infringed, Big Bang is not infringing in Canada, but would be on the hook for damages 
in the United States. Even so, Starchild would have an incentive to bring T’s patent to the court’s 
attention only if it could also convince the court that the patent is invalid or not infringed, but as 
noted a U.S. court is unlikely to entertain this line of argument.  
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Bang and C thereafter enter into a contract in Canada, under which Big 
Bang will use the method to make X in Canada for C, in exchange for a 
lump sum of $10 million. Starchild sues Big Bang for engaging in the 
infringing use of the method in the United States, and demands a reason-
able royalty reflecting some portion of Big Bang’s anticipated profit from 
exploiting the method in Canada—the theory being that a “willing licen-
see” would have agreed to pay a royalty that would have reflected the 
anticipated benefit it would earn from foreign sales derived from the ini-
tial U.S. use. 
This example, which is similar to Carnegie Mellon, is analytically 
straightforward. Whether Starchild, Big Bang, a third party, or no one 
owns a corresponding patent in Canada will affect Big Bang’s expected 
profit from the subsequent use of the method on behalf of C in Canada, 
and thus will affect how much Big Bang would be willing to pay for the 
initial U.S. use that enabled it to garner C’s business. All the court has to 
do is determine what that value is; and while this may be a factually com-
plex undertaking, it is not necessarily any more complex than similar de-
terminations for awarding reasonable royalties in other complex product 
cases. Of course, to the extent Big Bang could have attracted the same 
business by demonstrating the use of the method outside the United 
States, the U.S. royalty should reflect only the value, if any, of engaging 
in that initial use here rather than somewhere else. Moreover, any claim 
that the subsequent use of the method in Canada in turn would have at-
tracted further customers—and thus even greater royalties for the initial 
U.S. use—would have to be evaluated on its facts. In this regard, the “hy-
pothetical bargain” and proximate causes analyses would seem to merge, 
to the extent the bargain for the initial use of the method in the United 
States probably would not have been premised on unforeseeable or for-
tuitous consequences many steps removed from the initial U.S. use. Fi-
nally, one would expect courts to apply the single recovery rule to ex-
clude duplicative compensation for identical foreign uses. That said, if 
the Starchild can prove that the foreign sales were caused in fact and 
proximately caused by the predicate U.S. infringement, the analysis pre-
sented herein would lead to the conclusion that Starchild should recover 
a reasonable royalty for its domestic use, reflecting the anticipated value 
to Big Bang of those foreign sales.219   
 
 
219 Note that the question of whether a court may award a royalty for the domestic manufacture, 
use, or sale of a patented invention that reflects some portion of the benefit the licensee expects to 
derive from further exploitation of the invention outside the United States is distinct from whether 
a court may award a global license for the use of patented technologies. The latter question is one 
that courts and policymakers around the world are currently facing in connection with standard-
essential patents subject to commitments to license on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” 
(FRAND) terms. For discussion, see, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Is Global FRAND Litigation Spinning 
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F. Example 6 
In conformity with the TRIPS Agreement,220 U.S. patent owners en-
joy the exclusive right to, among other things, “offer to sell” their pa-
tented technologies within the United States.221 Exactly what this means, 
however, is debatable: in order to infringe, is it the offer that has to be 
made in the United States, the contemplated sale, or both?222 In a series 
of recent cases, the Federal Circuit has held that an offer made anywhere 
in the world infringes the U.S. patent owner’s rights, if the contemplated 
sale would occur in the United States, whereas an offer made in the 
United States does not infringe the U.S. patent owner’s rights, if the con-
templated sale would occur abroad.223 If this interpretation is correct, the 
issues presented in this Article are unlikely to arise in connection with the 
offer-to-sell right, since the loss-generating event (the sale) occurs in the 
United States. On the other hand, if this interpretation is wrong, such that 
a domestic offer to sell infringes even if the sale itself takes place else-
where,224 it is not clear how a court would evaluate the damages resulting 
from the domestic offer without taking into account the value of the re-
sulting foreign sales.225 Without attempting to resolve the interpretive 
question here, this Article will note only that, should the Supreme Court 
ever overturn the Federal Circuit’s current interpretation, this might pro-
vide further reason to believe that extraterritorial losses resulting from 
domestic infringement (here, offers to sell) are cognizable harms.     
G. Further Examples 
One could imagine other variations on the preceding six examples 
involving other rights provided under the Patent Act—including section 
271(b) and section 271(c), which deal, respectively, with induced and 
 
 
Out of Control?, 2021 PATENTLY-O L.J. 1 (2021), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2021/01/patentlyo-
litigation-spinning.html [https://perma.cc/Z6JD-S9YU].          
220 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 128, art. 28(1)(a). 
221 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018). 
222 For discussion of various possible interpretations, see Dennis Crouch, Infringing?: Offers (Made 
in the US) to Sell (Abroad), PATENTLY-O (Nov. 9, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/11/in-
fringing-offers-abroad.html [https://perma.cc/KA7N-VW8X]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality 
and Tangibility After Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1100–05 (2012). 
223 See Tex. Advanced Optoelecs. Sols., Inc. v. Renesas, Elecs. Am., Inc., 895 F.3d 1304, 1330 
n.12 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 831 F.3d 1369, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
224 For discussion of various possible interpretations, see Crouch, supra note 222; Holbrook, supra 
note 222. 
225 Unless the domestic offer to sell indirectly impacts price levels in the United States. See Timothy 
R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to 
Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of Infringe-
ment, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 790–97 (2003). 
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contributory infringement;226 section 271(f);227 or section 271(g), which 
prohibits the importation, use, offer to sell, and sale of (even unpatented) 
products within the United States, if those products were made abroad by 
means of a process patented in the United States.228 It is unlikely that a 
lengthy discussion of these other provisions would add anything to the 
mix, however, because the same general principles should apply: if the 
defendant could have achieved the same end result by engaging in con-
duct outside the United States, the domestic conduct at issue is not the 
cause-in-fact of that result. Alternatively, if the end result is a remote, 
unforeseeable, indirect, or speculative consequence of the domestic con-
duct, or if awarding monetary compensation would enable the patent 
owner to recover twice for the same loss, the court should deny the re-
quested relief. Only claims for extraterritorial damages that satisfy these 
three screening conditions will remain, whatever the specific right in-
fringed happens to be.      
CONCLUSION 
The question of whether U.S. patent owners may recover extraterri-
torial damages resulting from an act of domestic patent infringement is 
one that the lower courts are now having to rethink, following the Su-
preme Court’s decision in WesternGeco. This Article argues that the an-
swer is, generally, yes—that such damages are, and should be, cognizable 
harms under U.S. patent law, but only subject to three important limiting 
doctrines, namely cause-in-fact, proximate cause, and the single recovery 
rule. This Article also provides several examples to guide courts, in the 
United States and elsewhere, in deciding whether such damages are ap-
propriate in specific cases.         
 
 
226 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)–(c) (2018). Contrary to the general presumption against extraterritori-
ality, the Federal Circuit has held that when a person outside the United States induces another 
inside the United States to infringe a U.S. patent, the person acting outside the United States is 
liable under section 271(b). See Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
Whether Merial’s extraterritorial application of U.S. law remains valid under the WesternGeco 
framework is debatable. See Robert H. Stier, Jr., Extraterritoriality and the Active Inducement of 
Infringement, 19 UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 204 (2020). On the difficulties of determining appro-
priate damages for induced or contributory infringement, see Dmitry Karshtedt, Damages for Indi-
rect Patent Infringement, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 911 (2014).  
227 Recall that the Supreme Court expressly left open the question of whether WesternGeco’s lost 
profits were proximately caused by ION’s violation of section 271(f)(2) and did not address cause-
in-fact and double recovery issues at all. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing 
WesternGeco). 
228 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2018). There is also a general right against the importation of infringing 
products. See id. § 271(a).   
